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1 INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
The science of economics describes how scares resources are allocated within a 
complex system, where those with an excess of a commodity channel their assets to 
meet a demand of individuals in need of the resource. The broad field of economics can 
further be divided into several subcategories, depending on the type of resource 
considered, or the sphere of agents acting on the supply and demand of a good. In 
financial economics, that good is money and the activity of finance is the application of 
a set of techniques that individuals and entities use to manage their financial affairs, 
particularly the differences between supply and demand of capital and the risks 
associated with the subsequent use of that resource.
The area of corporate finance deals in turn with the question of how a firm is financed 
effectively to enhance the capital investments channelled to its activities. Businesses are 
built on capital that either gives an investor control of the company with residual rights 
to cash flows (equity), or ensures senior claims to distributed funds without direct 
ownership (debt). Theory on a firm’s optimal mix of these two capital types was 
established by Modigliani and Miller (1958), who thus opened the floodgates on a vast 
area of research within modern corporate finance. Their groundbreaking work was 
followed by further theoretical papers in the field on, among others, agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)), signalling through capital structure (Ross (1977)), and 
firm’s debt policy (Myers (1977)). As these key mechanisms of corporate financing 
functions took shape, research continued to evolve into areas considering particular 
aspects of either equity or debt financing. On the liability side, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977) discuss already the maturity of debt within the scope of their 
framework, while Merton (1977) set forth theories for explicit valuation of debt 
contracts bearing default risk. 
Three decades later, the literature on debt and fixed income research has vastly 
expanded both in terms of theoretical manuscripts as well as empirical studies. What has 
changed even more dramatically is the landscape where supply today meets demand; in 
Europe, a new, wide capital market was established with the inauguration of the Euro-
currency in 1999, today common in thirteen European countries1. The broad market for 
capital has not only lowered national barriers, created a more stable interest rate 
environment and eased frictions for capital flows within the EMU-area, but also enabled 
firms seeking funding to have access to a vast audience of debt investors as an 
alternative to Europe’s traditionally heavy dependency on bank lending.
It is against this background and in light of these developments that I have conducted 
empirical studies on corporate funding on the European debt capital markets. 
Consequently, in this thesis I analyse a firm’s access to and behaviour on the capital 
market, subsequent the decision to raise capital through the issuance of arm’s length 
debt on the bond market. I contribute specifically to enhance our knowledge in the 
1 Currently, the Euro is the official currency in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. Greece joined the Eurozone 
in 2001, Slovenia in 2007 and on January 1st, 2008 the list will be extended by two additional members, 
namely Cyprus and Malta. 
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fields of corporate finance and financial markets by considering explicitly firms’ 
primary market activities within the new market area.  
My thesis consists of three separate essays, which are briefly outlined below. A more in-
depth discussion on their contribution and findings is provided in section 5. The first
essay considers the reputation of an issuer on the market. The study combines 
theoretical arguments from the literature on information asymmetries with those of debt 
maturity and shows that reputation affects the debt maturity choice of firms. Results 
highlight the market’s ability to provide flexible funding to known counterparties, 
whereas new comers, irrespective of their credit quality, are offered a more restricted 
term to maturity on debt through the capital markets. Essay two examines the choice of 
interest rate exposure on newly issued debt. Previous studies provide evidence that 
firms accessing the capital markets limit their use of derivatives and choose their debt 
type directly to fit their overall funding situation. Thus, firms seeking debt capital 
through the bond market are not likely to utilise derivatives to alter the original interest 
rate exposure of issued debt. I show that firms time their interest rate exposure with 
respect to market movements and find that firms seek increased portions of fixed rate 
debt as the interest rates are below their long-term averages, a strong characteristic of 
the post-Euro times. In the third and final essay, I explore pricing anomalies on 
corporate debt issues. Firms do not seem to utilise the full maturity spectrum when 
choosing the maturity on their debt, whereby new debt issues are highly concentrated to 
a few, specific maturities. The herding behaviour appears to affect the pricing of new 
issues and I find empirical evidence suggesting that these issues are priced less 
favourably than bonds issued at a maturity deviating from the norm.  
The remaining part of this introduction is kept on a general level. Section 2 gives a 
description of the European debt capital market, its birth and identifies some of its 
unique characteristics. Section 3 reviews the theoretical framework, while section 4 
briefly summarizes related empirical work. And finally, section 5 summarizes the 
contribution of the thesis and provides an overview of the three essays. 
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2 A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL 
MARKETS
The integrated European debt capital market has undoubtedly broaden the possibilities 
for companies to access funding from the public and challenged investors to cope with 
an ever increasing complexity of its market participants. Well into the Euro-era, it is 
clear that the unified market has created potential for all involved parties, where 
investment opportunities are able to meet a supply of funds from a broad geographical 
area now summoned under a single currency. Europe’s traditionally heavy dependency 
on bank lending as a source of debt capital is thus easing as corporate residents are able 
to tap into a deep and liquid capital market to satisfy their funding needs. With 
increased sophistication comes also an improved knowledge and understanding of the 
market and its participants, whereby market efficiency should be seen improving.  
2.1. Transition from bank dependency towards market originated debt 
European firms have traditionally relied heavily on their bank-relationships as a source 
of debt capital; Rajan and Zingales (2003) estimate that some 80% of debt held by 
German firms in 1994 originated from banks, while only one-tenth was obtained from 
the securities markets. Similarly, Danthine, Giavazz and Thadden (2000) report that in 
1993, more than three-quarters of the total liabilities on the balance sheets of European 
non-financial corporation was bank debt. By 1996 the figure had fallen and varied 
between 45-70%, still high compared with the United States (1993: 32%, 1996: 9.4%). 
Table 1 presents a more detailed view of these statistics.
Table 1  Bank debt as a share of total debt liabilities. Source: Danthine, Giavazz and Thadden 
(2000)
Thus, it seems that the importance of bank lending deteriorated during the second half 
of the 1990s, although Pagano and von Thadden (2004) note the “it is difficult to tell 
whether the change towards a stronger reliance on bonds has been driven mainly by 
firms or the banks themselves.”2 The introduction of the Euro-currency in 1999 certainly 
seems to have had a further impact on the debt financing practices in the Euro area. 
Bond issuance in the Euro-area surged with the inauguration of the common currency; 
2 M. Pagano and E. L. von Thadden (2004), page 9 
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volumes in the Euro-area private sector was less than 26% of its US counterpart in 
1998, but tripled to 74% in 1999. In terms of absolute volume, the private sector 
issuance rose from $124 billion to $273 billion between 1994 and 1998. By contrast, the 
next year, as the new currency was adopted, issuance volume for the private sector 
reached a remarkable $657 billion. This initial flow of bond issuance did not ebb out, 
but remained high and in 2004 Euro-area issuance was still at $550 billion, more than 
four times the volume of 1994.3
2.2. Increased sophistication in assessing credit risk  
Another prominent characteristic of the market has been its capacity to increasingly 
absorb debt issues of varying credit qualities. With the development of the market, 
investors focused efforts on assessing credit risks once the currency and cross-boarder 
interest rate risks were no longer present. As sophistication increased among investor, 
they became more willing to bear credit risk, which opened the market for firms of ever 
lower creditworthiness (Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003)). In the process, the market as a 
whole saw a change in the profile of issuers, as non-financial firms increasingly sought 
their funding from the bond markets. In 1998, more than 85% of the total volume of 
outstanding corporate bonds was issued by financial institutions, while industrial firms 
stood for a mere 7% and the utility sector for 6% of the volume. Five years later, in 
2003, bonds by industrials constituted for 38% of the total volume, while the share of 
financials had plummeted to 54% (Baele et al. (2004)).  
A similar picture is given by chart 1, which presents statistics on the evolution of 
outstanding debt by credit ratings4. While the volumes for the two highest credit 
categories (AAA and AA) have remained fairly stable over the measured period, lower 
credit rating categories (A and BBB) have seen a substantial increase in their presence 
in the market. The A-rated segment increased its volume by more than 600%, from €30 
billion in to €220 billion between 1998 and 2003. Similarly, the BBB-rated segment 
accounted for about €3 billion of the outstanding value and was almost non-existent in 
1998, but amounted to more than €182 billion only five years later in 2003. In relative 
terms, issues by firms of BBB-credit rating increased from less than 2 percent in 1998 to 
about 27 percent in 2003. 
3 Source: BIS statistics, Danthine, Giavazz, and Thadden (2000) and Pagano and von Thadden . 
4 Source: L. Baele, et al (2004). The sample covers only investment-grade corporate bonds with a 
minimum size of issue of €100 million and includes only bonds constituting the Merrill Lynch corporate 
bond index. 
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Figure 1 Chart 1 - Outstanding debt by credit rating categories, from highest (AAA) to lowest 
(BBB) investment-grade quality 1998-2003. Source: ECB (Baele et al. (2004)). 
After the introduction of the common currency, it was the Euro-area firms who 
displayed strongest activity on the corporate bond market, as shown by Rajan and 
Zingales (2003), indicative of the opportunities companies sought to seize by 
diversifying their debt away from bank dependency and accessing the large pool of 
investors now available through the debt capital markets. One aspect certainly seems to 
be the increasing availability of long-term funding in the bond market. Pagano and von 
Thadden (2004) suggest that this in particular has been a driver for the surge in 
corporate bond issuance in Europe. As national barrier eroded and interest rates for the 
EMU-members converged towards over-all lower yields, a new source of debt capital 
emerged to the vast majority of corporate residents under the new currency and gave an 
alternative to the traditionally more maturity-restricted bank debt. Quoting Pagano and 
von Thadden (2004), page 27: 
“[But] the benefits have been no less important for European companies, which have acquired 
cheaper access to a market that can disenfranchise them from banks for the provision of debt 
finance. The effect on company financing and the attendant effects on credit markets are likely 
to be the most pervasive legacy of European bond market integration.” 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS 
The irrelevance theorem set forth by Modigliani and Miller (1958) states that the capital 
structure mix of debt and equity does not affect the value of the firm. As the underlying 
assumption for MM theorem are relaxed to correspond with real world imperfections, 
we can identify three different theories claiming affect on the capital structure of a firm; 
models based on tax considerations, asymmetric information and agency costs. Both 
corporate and personal taxes affect the optimal capital structure of a firm (Modigliani 
and Miller (1963), Miller (1977), Kim (1978), De Angelo and Masulis (1980)). Equally, 
the pecking order theory in corporate finance and the signalling function of debt 
securities issuance represent models based on asymmetric information. The pecking 
order theory states the preference to use internal finance, followed by low-risk debt and 
by equity in the last resort (Myers and Majluf (1984); Myers (1984)). Signalling models 
contend that a firm’s choice to issue debt securities may signal to outside investors 
information about the firm and its quality (Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977)). 
Agency models, in turn, state that corporate control considerations may also play a role 
in the determination of the capital structure (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers 
(1977)).
Debt securities are one of the many financing sources the toolbox of corporate finance. 
In studying the issuance of corporate debt, my research focuses on three specific aspects 
of corporate funding through the use of capital markets; namely the determinants of 
maturity of issued debt, the choice of interest rate exposure and factors affecting term 
structure of credit risk premiums on newly issued debt. Relevant theories for each of 
these segments build upon those discussed above, although the context in which they 
are presented varies for each area. The following subsections review some of the 
relevant theories for the chosen research topics. 
3.1. Theory on the determinants of debt maturity  
Academic literature recognises four main classes of theories on the determinants of debt 
maturity, namely the maturity-matching hypothesis, the tax hypothesis, the agency cost 
hypothesis, the signalling and liquidity risk hypothesis. In addition, debt subordination 
has further implication on debt maturity. The maturity-matching hypothesis, proposed 
by Myers (1977), argues that a firm should match the maturity of its assets with the 
liabilities it carries. Together with the tax hypothesis (see Brick and Ravid (1985)), 
which states that corporate debt maturity is positively correlated with yield curve 
movements due to obtained tax shield benefits as interest rates rise, these two theories 
reflect specific firm-level asset characteristics and functions of corporate tax ratios on 
the choice of debt maturity.  
While less tangible, models on information asymmetries help explain debt maturity 
decisions based on the perceived credit quality of the issuing firm. Myers (1977) and 
Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) argue that agency costs of debt can be alleviated by 
issuing short-term debt, which can be re-priced to reflect new information Flannery 
(1986) suggests that the debt maturity structure of a firm signals private information 
about its quality. Utilising shorter maturity debt generates higher costs due to more 
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frequent refinancing, thus separating high-quality firms from low-quality firms, where 
the former will issue at the short end of the maturity spectrum to signal higher quality, 
while the latter, unable to pay the reoccurring transaction costs, is forced to issue long-
term debt.  
Diamond (1991a) presents a similar, albeit non-monotonic relationship between debt 
maturity and firm quality based on liquidity risk; issuing short-term debt increases the 
roll-over frequency of debt, thus exposing the firm to greater uncertainty on the 
availability of funds at each maturity date. Short-term debt is issued by either high- or 
very low-quality firms, while issuers of creditworthiness between these extremes prefer 
long-term funding. Diamond (1993) shows that firms maximize their debt capacity by 
bearing short-term senior debt and long-term junior debt. Short-term senior debt is more 
information sensitive and preferred if firms anticipate positive news to arrive. It also 
gives control rights to lenders in case of default, at which point lenders prefer to 
liquidate.
3.2. Theory on the choice of interest rate exposure  
Choosing a particular interest rate exposure signals firm quality. Guedes and Thompson 
(1995) develop a model in which the riskier choice of debt signals favourable news 
about firm quality. Bearing floating rate debt during periods of higher inflation volatility 
stabilises operating income after interest expenses, since the inflation component is 
reflected both in gross operating income and nominal interest rate expanses payable by 
firms. Fixed rate debt is preferred when real market interest rates fluctuate more relative 
to inflation, while times characterised by relatively higher expected inflation volatility 
favours floating rate debt. Thus, choosing debt that is destabilising cash-flows and 
therefore riskier is considered a signalling superior firm quality. Titman (1992) presents 
a model where interest rate uncertainty subjects firms to greater likelihood of financial 
distress. An increase in interest rate volatility may induce firms to issue long-term debt 
despite otherwise preferring to issue short-term debt due to reasons of information 
asymmetry.  
The term to maturity of debt is also reflected in the choice of interest rate exposure. 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995a) derive a model for valuing floating and fixed rate debt, 
which considers both the likelihood of default for risky debt and interest rate risks. They 
show that a floating-rate payment can be less valuable in the short-term and that the 
value can be an increasing function of the time until payment when interest rates are 
below their average long-run levels. This in turn implies that floating rate debt is less 
favourable than fixed rate debt during periods of low interest rate, since floating rate 
payments are valued lower relative to fixed rate payments. 
3.3. Theory on the term structure of credit risk  
Credit risk models can be divided into two main approaches: structural-form models and 
reduced-form models. Structural-form models originate from the option-pricing 
framework by Black and Scholes (1973). Merton (1974) utilises this framework to 
model corporate liabilities as contingent claims on a firm’s assets. Models augmenting 
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the Merton approach for valuing risky debt based on asset values have been developed 
by, among others, Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995b), Leland and Toft (1996) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).  Merton’s 
model assumes non-stochastic interest rates, while Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan 
(1993) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995b) allow interest rates to be stochastic. Leland 
and Toft (1996) provide a closed-form solution to estimate the credit spread, which 
considers the optimal capital structure when firms are able to choose both the maturity 
and amount of debt it issues.  
Structural-form models suffer from difficulty of empirical implementation, since the 
value of assets may not be known. By contrast, reduced-form models assume that the 
default process is driven by an exogenous random variable; the probability of default 
and the recovery rate in case of default vary stochastically with time. For instance, 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) provide a model where the probability of default 
follows a Markov process. Other reduce-form models include e.g. Litterman and Iben 
(1991), Lando (1998) and Duffie and Singleton (1999). Litterman and Iben (1991) 
recognize that the term structure of credit risk is not flat. 
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4 CENTRAL FINDINGS IN THE EMPIRICAL DEBT 
LITERATURE
Empirical research on company debt can generally be divided into two different 
categories, depending on the context in which these securities are examined. The 
classical debt maturity literature tests the implications of relaxing assumptions 
underlying the MM-propositions on the entire liability structure of a company’s balance 
sheet. The merits of such testing rests on the ability to evaluate these theories, while it is 
from an empirical perspective extremely challenging, since it requires intensive data 
gathering and handling. As a results, empirical research has acknowledge debt securities 
as an adequate alternative in studying firm-level use of debt, where accurate data is 
more readily available.  
Debt securities research can further be divided into studies on the primary and the 
secondary market. In the latter case, the focus has been placed on the pricing of this 
traded asset class and how the underlying credit risk is reflected in investor decision. 
The former, however, is more closely related to corporate finance, as the primary 
market reflects the direct funding costs and attributes of corporations accessing the 
capital market. Thus, studying incremental debt issues yields valuable insight into firm-
level decisions on debt financing. Only in recent years has data for this type of research 
become adequately available, especially for the European primary debt capital markets. 
Data on debt securities by European firms seeking funding on their home-market under 
the Euro-currency represents also a cornerstone in my thesis.  
Empirical work in the area of corporate finance and capital markets is vast and the 
review into the literature is far from comprehensive. Nevertheless, I will review shortly 
present some of the central findings on debt issuance, as a more extensive survey is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
4.1. Evidence on the debt maturity  
A central and oft-cited study by Graham and Harvey (2001), in which the authors 
survey chief financial officers in the US, portrays a wide variety of considerations and 
practices that company managers act upon as they deal with the funding needs faced by 
their respective firms. Graham and Harvey find that the top determinants among these 
practitioners for the choice of debt maturity are the matching of debt maturity with asset 
life, minimizing liquidity risk by issuing long-term debt and timing the market when 
short-end interest rates are low relative to long-term interest rates.   
Related empirical studies include Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), 
Guedes and Opler (1996) and Bali and Skinner (2006), of which the first two evaluate 
the maturity of the liability structure, while the latter two examine determinants of debt 
maturity for incremental debt issues. These results, by and large, are parallel to the 
responses given in the Graham and Harvey (2001) survey. Material contributions arise 
from recognizing the importance of credit quality categories (Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Bali and Skinner (2006); Stohs and Mauer (1996)), liquidity risk (Guedes and Opler 
(1996); Stohs and Mauer (1996)) and debt subordination (Bali and Skinner (2006)). 
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Main findings support debt maturity theories on credit qualities by Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991a), maturity matching by Myers (1977), but reject the tax hypothesis by 
Brick and Ravid (1985). In addition, Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) and Bali 
and Skinner (2006) find evidence that firms respond to a steeper slope of the yield curve 
by shortening the maturity of debt, similar to the responses in survey Graham and 
Harvey (2001). 
4.2. Studies on choosing fixed or floating rate debt 
Faulkender (2005) examines the interest rate exposure for firms in the chemical industry 
and finds that i) firms choose fixed rate exposure when economic conditions are 
expected to worsen, ii) firms engage in market timing through the use of derivatives but 
do not hedge cash-flows; and iii) the slope of the yield curve at the time of the debt 
issue determines whether firms use interest rate swaps to alter the interest rate exposure 
of their debt. Similarly, Vickery (2005) studies the interest rate exposure choices of 
small firms and finds evidence suggesting that high real interest rates and a steep yield 
curve are correlated with a lower proportion of fixed debt.
Other empirical studies have examined the floating rate share of firms’ liability 
structure. Chava and Purnanandam (2007) study how managerial incentives affect the 
ratio of floating rate debt and report that smaller firms with more valuable growth 
options that are closer to financial distress adopt a conservative debt financing strategy 
by maintaining lower levels of floating-rate debt. This is in line with findings reported 
by Vickery (2005). By contrast Covitz and Sharpe (2005) find that smaller, lower-rated 
firms tend to have greater initial interest rate exposures on their total liabilities 
compared with larger firms. 
4.3. The term structure of credit risk 
Empirical work in the field of credit risk finds evidence both supporting and to some 
extent conflicting the model prediction for the shape of credit curves (see. e.g. Sarig and 
Warga (1989), Helwege and Turner (1999), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) and 
on European data van Landschoot (2003)).
Nevertheless, there is consensus in the literature that the credit yield curve for high-
grade bonds is increasing with maturity, while disagreement prevails on its shape for 
lower quality firms. Further, empirical evidence on the determinants of credit risk 
premiums show that spreads are also affected by tax considerations, secondary market 
liquidity and non-diversifiable systematic risk ( Elton et al. (2001) , Elton et al. (2004), 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Gabbi and Sironi (2005)). Apart from 
Gabbi and Sironi (2005), all others conduct their studies on secondary market data.  
Time-varying trends and macroeconomic cycle affect the over-all credit risk premiums. 
Duffee (1998) finds that Treasury yields have a negative correlation with the risk 
premium for corporate bonds. Evidence also suggests that default probabilities and 
recovery rates vary through business cycles, affecting the premium required by market 
participants to bear credit risk (e.g., Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), Duffie, 
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Saita and Wang (2007) and Pesaran et al. (2006)). While these studies reflect the pricing 
of secondary market securities, the premiums are reflected onto new issues of debt in 
the primary market. 
12
5 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS 
A general theme in the three essays included in my thesis is the utilisation of data from 
the primary European capital markets, which in particular contributes to the existing 
literature by giving understanding of the new market area in the wake of diminishing 
bank dependency.  Additionally, each essay is devoted to individual research questions 
that contribute to a specific niche in the broader field of corporate finance and capital 
markets literature. 
5.1. Essay 1: With good reputation size does not matter: issue frequency and the 
determinants of debt maturity
The first essay in my thesis examines the effect firm reputation has on the determinants 
of debt maturity. Diamond (1991b) argues that reputation helps alleviate information 
asymmetry problems, since it implies lower degrees of adverse selection to be present in 
the future. While empirical research in the field of debt maturity has mainly focused on 
testing various theories, my foremost contribution to the existing literature is combining 
the reputation argument and the debt maturity literature, which enables me to show that 
an issuer’s reputation in itself affects debt maturity.  
Utilising data from the European primary bond market between 1999 and 2005, I 
confirm previous empirical findings that firms choose the maturity of their debt with 
changes in the level and slope of the yield curve. In addition, I provide descriptive 
evidence of the gradual development of the European debt capital market. By focusing 
the research on non-financial corporate issuers, I provide specific insight into the 
funding of these firms and industries under the new currency and its capital market.  
And finally, credit quality alone is not a key determinant of debt maturity, but in 
combination with the contractual coupon payments they materially affect the maturity 
of issued debt. Through this employed methodology, I am able to establish an implied 
credit quality for issuers lacking a credit rating by a credit rating agency, which gives 
further insight about the firms utilising the bond market for funding. 
5.2. Essay 2: Riding a rollercoaster or the merry-go-round? Market timing and 
the choice of interest rate exposure on corporate debt. 
The second essay examines determinants of interest rate exposure for incremental 
corporate debt issues. Previous studies reveal that firms only marginally utilise 
derivatives to swap the original interest rate exposure on new debt. In spite of this 
evidence, the literature has mainly been focused on studying the use of derivatives and 
arguing what final risk exposure firms ought to have, while it would seem motivated to 
specifically examine the drivers affecting the original interest rate exposure of debt in 
the absence of derivative-instruments. As a result, the second essay in the thesis studies 
the initial debt type of incremental debt issues on the Euro-denominated capital market 
excluding derivatives, which allows for a considerably wider cross-sectional sample 
size compared with previous studies. 
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The adopted approach yields also a greater insight into the debt capital market’s ability 
and willingness to fund corporate borrowers in different interest rate environments and 
provides straightforward evidence on firm risk management strategies on a market 
absent of bank monitoring. And finally, my sample of transaction-level observations, as 
opposed to measurements and proxies on entity-wide debt structure, produces well-
defined and verifiable points in time at which parties agree on terms for each debt 
contract under specific interest rate regimes and with accurate descriptions on the 
characteristics of individual debt issues. To the best of my knowledge, there are no 
similar studies to be found in the current empirical literature. 
I show that the maturity of debt is by far the strongest driver for the choice of debt type; 
longer term to maturity increases the likelihood of fixed rate debt. In addition, the 
obtained empirical evidence follow predictions by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995a), 
who suggest higher portions of fixed rate debt when interest rates are below their long-
term averages, a strong characteristic of the post-Euro times. 
5.3. Essay 3: Costly lemmings in the bond market? An empirical analysis of the 
term structure of credit spreads. 
The third and final paper examines the credit spread between government bonds and 
bonds issued by firms of varying credit quality at different maturities. Current literature 
has explored both theoretically and empirically factors affecting the overall credit risk 
premium with the normal assumption that risky debt pays a premium over the Treasury 
yield curve that relates to the probability of default, the expected loss in case of default 
and a compensation of bearing systematic, non-diversifiable credit risk.
On the other hand, researchers have suggested that the credit yield curve may not 
conform to the assumption of a smooth credit curve and conclude that markets may 
systematically misprice bonds in parts of the yield curve. Consequently, I study the 
credit risk premiums at various maturities in order to evaluate the pricing over the 
maturity spectrum and seek to answer the question of whether the term structure of 
credit risk for new issues is as smoothly increasing as many theoretical models predict 
and various studies assume.  
The empirical approach adopted in this study departs from previous studies in two 
essential ways; first, the objective is not to test existing theoretical models, but 
empirically explore the pricing of credit risk over the yield curve. Second, the study is 
conducted on spreads observed at issuance in the primary market for corporate bonds, as 
opposed to traded securities on the secondary market, and constitutes therefore actual 
pricing of debt faced by firms seeking arm’s length funding on the capital market. The 
evidence provided in the third essay appears to highlight a shortcoming of existing 
theoretical models, where the credit yield curve is not smooth, but affected by the 
supply of issues at various parts of the yield curve.
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6 SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE DATA MATERIAL UTILISED 
IN THE ESSAYS 
Data utilised in this thesis is a central part of my research and originates from 
Dealogic’s database, which contains issue-specific information on Euro-denominated 
bond issues by EMU-country residents. I have chosen to restrict each study to include 
only debt issued by non-financial firms, thus excluding the financial sector. Financial 
intermediaries differ significantly in their business and financial structure from 
industrial firms and are therefore commonly studied in isolation. Focusing my study on 
industrial firms allows for better comparison with earlier empirical literature, which has 
almost exclusively considered only non-financial firms.   
Each essay seeks to answer a unique research question and consequently utilises a 
slightly different sample of the entire data set. Table 2 highlights these differences and 
presents additional statistical properties for the data.  
The most obvious difference in the samples is the number of observations considered in 
each essay. Three key elements drive these differences; i) the type of debt included in 
the study, ii) the credit rating categories and iii) maturity of debt considered in each 
study. Essay two includes debt issues of both fixed and floating type and has a total of 
1353 issues included in its final sample, while essays one and three comprise only 
fixed-rate debt, with 718 and 486 bond issues, respectively. The third essay is restricted 
in terms of maturity and credit quality; due to the adopted methodology in the last essay, 
I include only firms of investment-grade quality and exclude issues with a maturity 
exceeding 10 years. Also, data utilised in essay one ends in December 2005. Data was 
unavailable when the project was initialized and due to the construction of the dataset, I 
was later unable to update the final data sample in the first essay to reflect the same 
time-period considered in essays two and three. 
Table 2 reports a country-breakdown for each data sample and the share of issues 
originating from each EMU country as well as the number of issues by subsidiaries to 
non-EMU residents. In my essays, I have studied the European bond market as a whole 
and have not considered the individual issuer’s origin as a factor in my research. From 
the beginning, I felt the need to keep my research focused and that studying country-
specific determinants would require an entirely different approach to the research 
questions. I hope that stating the county-breakdown here will give rise to new ideas for 
further studies and that researchers interested in the European bond market find the 
figures interesting and pursue new research questions in light of these statistics.
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Table 2 Summary statistics of data used in each essay 
Number of observations in final sample
Considered time-period
Number of issues by debt type
Fixed rate debt 718 100% 812 60.0% 486 100%
Floating rate debt - - 541 40.0% - -
Maturity spectrum of bonds (years)
Credit quality of issued debt 
Investment grade 514 71.6% 1110 82.0% 486 100%
Speculative grade 127 17.7% 134 9.9% - -
Unrated 77 10.7% 109 8.1% - -
Breakdown of issues by country 
Austria 9 1.3% 11 0.8% 6 1.2%
Belgium 15 2.1% 37 2.7% 10 2.1%
Finland 17 2.4% 27 2.0% 14 2.9%
France 216 30.1% 389 28.8% 165 34.0%
Germany 72 10.0% 108 8.0% 38 7.8%
Greece 7 1.0% 8 0.6% 2 0.4%
Ireland 16 2.2% 69 5.1% 11 2.3%
Italy 40 5.6% 64 4.7% 22 4.5%
Luxembourg 70 9.8% 89 6.6% 28 5.8%
Netherlands 244 34.0% 514 38.0% 175 36.0%
Portugal 4 0.6% 5 0.4% 5 1.0%
Spain 8 1.1% 32 2.4% 10 2.1%
Issues by subsidiaries to non-EMU residents
Australia 2 0.3% 2 0.2% 2 0.4%
Bulgaria 1 0.1% 2 0.2% - -
Guernsey 1 0.1% 1 0.1% - -
Hungary 2 0.3% 2 0.2% - -
Japan 2 0.3% 19 1.4% 1 0.2%
Mexico 1 0.1%
Poland 9 1.3% 7 0.5% 5 1.0%
Russia 2 0.3% 2 0.2% - -
Slovakia 2 0.3% 2 0.2% - -
South Africa - - 1 0.1% 1 0.2%
Sweden 3 0.4% 3 0.2% 1 0.2%
Switzerland 15 2.1% 23 1.7% 14 2.9%
United Kingdom 5 0.7% 12 0.9% 6 1.2%
United States 28 3.8% 76 5.6% 19 3.9%
TOTAL 72 9.9% 153 11.3% 49 10.1%
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WITH GOOD REPUTATION SIZE DOES NOT MATTER:  
ISSUE FREQUENCY AND THE DETERMINANTS  
OF DEBT MATURITY 
Abstract
This paper examines empirically the effect firm reputation has on the determinants of debt 
maturity. Utilising data from European primary bond market between 1999 and 2005, I find 
that reputation is a determinant of the maturity of newly issued debt, where firms of high or 
low reputation issue short and firms of mediocre reputation issue long term debt. Thus, 
reputation appears to mimic a non-monotonic relationship between credit quality and 
maturity. The annualised coupon payments are shown to be a significant factor in 
determining the debt maturity and reveal a monotonously increasing relationship between 
credit quality and debt maturity once controlled for. Finally, I show that issuers lacking a 
credit rating have an implied credit quality positioned between investment-grade and 
speculative-grade debt.  
Keywords: Corporate debt maturity, Debt seniority, Corporate Bonds, Reputation, 




This paper examines empirically the effect firm reputation has on the determinants of debt 
maturity. Theoretical papers provide us with variable projections on a firm’s choice of debt 
maturity, ranging from the matching of asset-maturity to tax-relief benefits and comprising 
various signalling effects based on information asymmetry and agency cost theories (see e.g. 
Myers (1977), Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980),  Brick and Ravid (1985), Flannery 
(1986), Diamond (1991a)). Diamond (1991b) argues that reputation helps alleviate 
information asymmetry problems, since reputation implies lower degrees of adverse 
selection to be present in the future. While empirical research has mainly focused on testing 
these theories in isolation, my foremost contribution to the existing literature is combining 
the reputation argument with the debt maturity literature and showing that an issuer’s 
reputation in itself affects debt maturity.  
Following Guedes and Opler (1996) and Bali and Skinner (2006), I study incremental debt 
issues, thereby departing from another strand of literature on debt maturity which looks at 
the entire liability structure on a firm’s balance sheet. The advantage of the incremental 
approach lies in that individual observations on debt maturity are exact and easily identified, 
while a weakness may be the wide variation in debt issue characteristics. To limit this 
disadvantage, I incorporate controls for a variety of debt issue features into my model. 
Utilising data from the European primary bond market between 1999 and 2005, I confirm 
previous empirical findings by Guedes and Opler (1996), Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler 
(2003) and Bali and Skinner (2006) that firms choose the maturity of their debt with changes 
in the level and slope of the yield curve, similar to conclusions that can be drawn from a 
survey among US chief financial officers conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001). 
I also provide evidence of the gradual development of the European debt capital market. 
Before the introduction of the common currency, most corporate bond issues where made by 
firms of highest credit qualities (see e.g. Pagano and von Thadden (2004), p.10). After 1999 
and the creation of the Euro-denominated debt capital market, issues of lower credit qualities 
have dominated the primary bond market, with fully new opportunities to access market-
based funding emerging to speculative-grade issuers. The new market place has also been 
quick to extend the term to maturity available to firms seeking corporate funding in terms of 
debt capital. By focusing the research on non-financial corporate issuers, I provide specific 
insight into the funding of these firms and industries under the new currency and its capital 
market.  
Diamond (1993) shows that firms maximize their debt capacity by bearing short-term senior 
debt and long-term junior debt. Parallel to Bali and Skinner (2006), I find empirical evidence 
to confirm Diamond’s prediction that debt of junior status has longer maturity than senior 
debt.
Additionally, I contribute further to the literature by showing that by controlling for coupon 
payments, a monotonically decreasing risk-maturity relationship is observed for debt issues, 
while omitting this control variable, as done in earlier work, produces on non-monotonic 
relationship between credit quality and debt maturity similar to Diamond (1991a). Thus, the 
credit quality alone is not a key determinant of debt maturity, but in combination with the 
contractual coupon payments they materially affect the maturity of issued debt. Finally, 
through this methodology, I am also able to establish an implied credit quality for issuers 
lacking a credit rating by a credit rating agency, which gives further insight about the firms 
utilising the bond market for funding. 
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1.2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis development 
This section presents the central theories on debt maturity. As the emphasis in this paper lies 
in factors concerning information asymmetries, I will spend more time discussing related 
predictions on debt maturity and only briefly touch other strands of theories. The academic 
literature basically recognises four main classes of theories on the determinants of debt 
maturity, namely the maturity-matching hypothesis, the tax hypothesis, the agency cost 
hypothesis, the signalling and liquidity risk hypothesis. Subordination has further 
implication on debt maturity. Each of the hypotheses provides variable projections on the 
choice of debt maturity.  
Perhaps the most intuitive of the theories is the maturity-matching hypothesis by Myers 
(1977), which argues that a firm should match the maturity of its assets with the liabilities it 
carries. Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996) and the qualitative survey by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find empirical evidence to support the hypothesis. Together with 
the tax hypothesis (see Brick and Ravid (1985)), which states that corporate debt maturity is 
positively correlated with yield curve movements due to obtained tax shield benefits as 
interest rates rise, these two theories reflect specific firm-level asset characteristics and 
functions of corporate tax ratios on the choice of debt maturity.  
The third pillar in the theoretical framework on debt maturity is the agency cost hypothesis. 
Myers (1977) and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) argue that information asymmetries 
caused by the agency cost of debt can be alleviated by issuing short-term debt, which 
matures before the growth options are exercised and can be re-priced to reflect new 
information. In other words, firms holding a wide opportunity set of investments should 
issue short-term debt. This hypothesis is, however, only supported by weak evidence in the 
empirical studies by Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Graham and Harvey (2001). 
While less tangible, models on information asymmetries help explain debt maturity 
decisions based on the perceived credit quality of the issuing firm. Flannery (1986) suggests 
that the debt maturity structure of a firm signals private information about its quality. In a 
world without costs, a low-quality firm can replicate the debt maturity choices of a high-
quality firm. Introducing costs creates a separating equilibrium; utilising shorter maturity 
debt generates higher costs due to more frequent refinancing, thus separating high-quality 
firms from low-quality firms, where the former will issue at the short end of the maturity 
spectrum to signal higher quality, while the latter, unable to pay the reoccurring transaction 
costs, is forced to issue long-term debt. Kale and Noe (1990) show that the separating 
equilibrium can exist even without transaction costs. 
Diamond (1991a) presents a similar, albeit non-monotonic relationship between debt 
maturity and firm quality based on liquidity risk; issuing short-term debt increases the roll-
over frequency of debt, thus exposing the firm to greater uncertainty on the availability of 
funds at each maturity date. High-quality firms, confident of their credit quality and the 
likelihood of continued funding, will issue short-term debt. The risk of facing an illiquid 
market gives firms with a lower credit quality an incentive to issue longer term debt. 
However, “circumventing” liquidity risk by issuing long-term debt may not be an option for 
very low-quality firms. Instead, they are screened out of the long-term maturity segment due 
to increasing credit risk premiums further along the credit curve and are, as a consequence, 
restricted to issue shorter-term debt. Short-term debt is therefore issued by either high- or 
very low-quality firms, while issuers with credit qualities between these extremes prefer 
long-term funding. Both Guedes and Opler (1996) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) find 
empirical evidence supporting Diamond’s and Flannery’s models. 
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Furthermore, theory suggests an inverse relationship between the seniority of debt and debt 
maturity. Diamond (1993) shows that firms maximize their debt capacity by bearing short-
term senior debt and long-term junior debt. Short-term senior debt is more information 
sensitive and preferred if firms anticipate positive news to arrive. It also gives control rights 
to lenders in case of default, at which point lenders prefer to liquidate. Thus, too much short-
term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. By bearing long-term junior debt while 
allowing additional future debt to be raised, the borrower can alleviate unwanted liquidation. 
Bali and Skinner (2006) provide empirical evidence confirming Diamond’s prediction. 
Problems associated with information asymmetries are predominant when negotiating debt 
agreements and remain present over the entire lifespan of such contracts. Firms may try to 
signal their counterparty quality through behaviour, but in many cases such actions are 
replicated by the peers from which the firms try to differentiate themselves. Diamond 
(1991b) argues that reputation “can eventually deal with moral hazard”1 because it implies 
that less adverse selection will be present in the future. Reputation may therefore be a 
significant and distinguishable way of alleviating some of the information asymmetry 
problems. While equity markets and stock exchange regulation obligate their members to 
reveal information to equity investors and thereby bridging information gaps, the same is not 
obvious in OTC-type bond markets. The hypothesis I propose suggests therefore that more 
frequent debt issuers gain from visiting the capital markets regularly and are met more 
favourably by the investors, where my main argument is that a higher reputation allows a 
firm to issue debt with longer maturity. Reoccurring debt issuance reveals information about 
the borrower to debt investors on a continuous basis and helps thereby deal with the 
information asymmetries. Berger et al. (2005) show that the average maturity of bank loans 
increase significantly when information asymmetries are lessened. From a theoretical 
perspective, my hypothesis reflects the reputation argument by Diamond (1991b) and it also 
makes practical sense; if a firm frequently visits the debt capital markets for funding and 
thereby reveals information about itself more often by building up a reputation among debt 
investors, it lessens information asymmetries, which in turn should be beneficial to both 
parties and reflected in the contractual relationship between them.  
1.3. Research methodology
The study is restricted to Euro-denominated fixed-rate bonds, issued by non-financial firms 
residing in EMU-countries and spanning a time-period beginning from the introduction of 
the Euro in 1999 to the year-end 2005. This choice is motivated by several factors; first, the 
gradual development of the Euro-denominated corporate bond market in terms of maturity 
spectrum available to corporate bond issuers has so far been undocumented in the literature. 
Second, concentrating only on non-financial issuers, gives specific answers to questions 
about their ability to adapt to and seek funding from a broader debt capital market. Third, the 
markets’ capacity to absorb maturities by a wide range of different qualities of corporate 
debt is of interest to academics and practitioners alike. Fourth, bonds with embedded 
features or varying coupon payments are essentially special cases of plain fixed-rate bonds 
and are therefore outside the scope of this study.
My model relates the maturity of incremental debt issues to macroeconomic factors with 
control variables for firm-quality and issue-specific characteristics. Using this incremental 
approach for testing the debt maturity theories is twofold; its strength lies in that individual 
observations on debt maturity are exact and easily identified, while a weakness may be the 
wide variation in debt issue characteristics. As a result, my model includes variables to 
control for the varying characteristics of the bonds in the final sample.  
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The model: 
MATi = i + 1[–]LEVELt + 2[–]SLOPEt + 3 [+/–]BBBAAAt + 4[+]COUPONi +
+ 5[+]SIZEi + 6[+/–]BOOKRUNi + 7[+]SUBi + 8[+/–]QUALi + 9[+]REPi + i
The dependent variable MATi is the natural log of one plus the maturity of bond i measured 
in years2, LEVELt is the 3 month EURIBOR-rate at time t, SLOPEt is measured as the 
difference between the yield of 10-year government bonds and the 3-month EURIBOR rate 
at time t, BBBAAAt is the market credit risk premium measured as the yield spread 
difference between AAA-rated and BBB-rated corporate bonds observed in the market, 
COUPONi is the annualised fixed coupon of issue i, SIZEi is the log of the amount of debt 
issued in million euros, BOOKRUNi is the allocation power of issue i, estimated by the 
number of financial institutions involved in the sale of the transaction. QUALi and SUBi are
categorical dummy-variables, where the former reflects the credit quality of an issuer 
determined by a credit rating from either Moody’s, Standard&Poor’s or both and the latter 
indicates whether the issued debt is contractually subordinated and has a junior debt status. 
REPi indicates the described reputation categories, to which issuers are allocated based on 
their activity in the market as measured by the frequency of issuance. Superscripts indicate 
the expected sign of the coefficients in the model. 
1.3.1. Determining reputation 
To test whether firm reputation affects the maturity of debt, I observe the frequency of 
issuance for each individual firm over the entire sample period. I categorise issuers as 
‘frequent’ or ‘infrequent’ based on the absolute number of issues they make during the seven 
year sample period and perform separate model-regression for each category. Firms with 
seven or more issues – equivalent to at least one issue per year on average – are categorized 
as frequent issuers, while those with six bond issues or less are denoted infrequent issuers. 
These threshold values are not derived from theory and may therefore seem artificial, since 
the issue-frequency is observed ex post, while the hypothesis implies that reputation has an 
ex ante effect on debt maturity. In effect, I make the assumption that an issuer has a given 
reputation before the start of my sample period and that the in-sample issue-frequency is 
representative of previous behaviour. Lastly, I categorise one-time issuers separately, 
resulting in three different groups of issuers; single issuers, infrequent issuers with 2-6 debt 
issues and frequent issuers with 7 or more issues in total.
1.4. Data and Descriptive statistics 
The data set originates from the Dealogic database, containing issue-specific information on 
Euro-denominated bond issues made by EMU-country residents from January 1st, 1999 to 
December 31st, 2005.
Raw data comprises 12.060 observations. I eliminate issues by governments3,
supranationals, financial institutions and any linked category based on the issuer type and 
issuer industry coded in the database. I further exclude floating-rate issues; collateralized or 
covered bonds; bonds with various embedded option-features; currency-, inflation- or index-
2 Following Allen N. Berger, et al (2005) the one in LN(1+Maturity) is included to avoid taking the log of a 
value close to zero, which would yield negative log maturities. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































linked bonds; bonds with variable payment schedules; tap-issues4; and other irregular 
features as noted in the database5. Unclear entries are cross-referenced with the Thomson 
ONE Banker database, after which incomplete or missing records are also excluded from the 
final sample, which thus consists of 718 plain fixed-rate bond-issues by 364 individual non-
financial corporate EMU-residents6. I use the date of the public announcement of a bond 
issue to identify it to a specific month in the sample period. Table 1 presents summary 
statistics for each variable. 
Data on interest rates is obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB). All yields are 
monthly averages quoted at mid-month and weighted by the nominal outstanding amounts of 
national government bonds in each maturity band. This method is chosen, because at the 
time of announcing a debt issue, the maturity of the issue has already been selected. Hence, 
economic conditions affecting the maturity must have been considered prior to the 
announcement of a debt issue.  
International Index Company produces iBoxx bond-indices, which I use for calculation of 
the credit risk premium between AAA- and BBB-category investment-grade bonds. This 
data is available from April 1st 1999 onwards.
Moody's Standard & Poor's Value Obs. Jan.99-Jun.02 Jul.02-Dec.05
Aaa AAA Investment-grade 1 56 33 23
Aa AA quality 2 84 59 25
A A 3 208 94 114
Baa BBB 4 166 89 77
Ba BB Speculative-grade 5 33 11 22
B B quality 6 88 36 52
CCC CCC 7 6 1 5
- - Unrated 0 77 59 18
Total 718 382 336
Rating agency
Table 2 Credit rating scales by rating agency. Credit rating categories and their corresponding 
numerical values, with observations frequencies by debt type. 
A credit rating by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s or both has been assigned to 641 of the 718 
bonds in the sample. I recode the rating categories with integer numbers in ascending order, 
where the highest AAA/Aaa-rating is coded as “1” and the lowest CCC/Caa is coded as “7”. 
For issues with split ratings, a composite rating is calculated corresponding to an average of 
4 Tap-issues are re-issues of a bond, executed in varying amounts and at different times, usually in response to 
investor demand. The main terms of the bond (issuing conditions, coupon and maturity) remain unchanged, but 
the issue price can vary according to market conditions. Tap-issues on bonds are thus left outside the sample, 
since they would induce a bias as the same bond appears multiple times in the sample. 
5  M. Bradley and M. R. Roberts (2004) show that bond covenants are priced. As such, an analogy could be 
drawn to the maturity of debt as well, since increased bondholder protection could arguably extend the 
available term to maturity on newly issued debt. Covenant practices in Europe have traditionally been lax and 
less adopted compared with the US. In addition, research in the field of debt maturity, whether in the US or 
Europe, has not either accounted previously for covenants. As a result, the role of covenant protection is not 
considered in this paper.  
6 All non-financial corporate issuer residing within the EMU-area are considered; Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece (2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. However, 
issuers in related colonies or territories to EMU countries, such as the French Polynesia or the Netherlands 
Antilles are omitted. On the other hand, issues by subsidiaries to other than EMU-residents are left in the 
sample; e.g. Toyota’s European arm, Toyota Motor Finance BV located in the Netherlands belongs to the final 
sample. 
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the values of the separate ratings assigned by the rating agencies. Unrated issues are coded as 
zero. The rating scales and their corresponding values are shown in table 2.7
1.4.1. Graphical presentation of general statistics 
Figure 1 shows six panels on the distribution of issues by rating categories and different 
maturity classes over the sample period and highlights a few key insights. Panel 1 graphs the 
stacked movement of the 3-month interest rate, the slope of the yield curve and the market 
credit risk premium over the sample period. We observe large fluctuations in the short-end 
level of interest rates in the beginning of the period, while it has remained low and stable 
during the last three years.  The slope of the yield curve has always remained positive, but 
was almost flat in early 2001. Based on survey results by Graham and Harvey (2001), we 
can expect that the larger the difference between the slope and level curve, the more 
attractive is short term debt issuance to firms. We also notice that the peak of interest rate 
level in late 2000 is higher than the combination of the short-term rate plus the yield curve 
slope mark-up from mid-2002 onwards. Meanwhile, the market credit risk premium has 
fluctuated between 0.497 and 2.192, reaching its peak in august 2002. Lastly, we observe 
that during the last year of the sample period, the overall issuance cost for long term debt 
including a credit risk premium is lower than the short-end cost of issuance in early 2001, 
meaning that a high quality firm issuing a short term bond in early 2001 paid a similar or 
higher fixed coupon than a firm of lower quality with long term maturity debt during the last 
years included in the sample. 
Rating categories A and BBB are predominant among the rated issues represented in the 
sample, as seen in panel 2. Unrated issues account for roughly 11% of the total number of 
issues in the sample, but their relative number seems to decrease towards the end of the 
sample period. By contrast, speculative-grade issues increase in number. In panel 3 we 
observe that the speculative-grade issuers target almost uniquely the 7-15 year maturity 
segments and are not present in either very long or short maturity categories, while lower 
investment-grade categories A and BBB utilise shorter maturities more often. This 
separation between lower investment-grade and speculative-grade issues follows Diamond 
(1991a) suggestion that lower quality firms issue longer term debt to minimize liquidity risk 
problems. Interestingly, almost two-thirds of the unrated issues are shorter than seven years, 
perhaps reflecting higher information asymmetries due to lacking credit ratings, while the 
highest quality firms (AAA and AA rated) issue debt in relative terms more evenly over the 
entire maturity spectrum.  
Panel 4 graphs the distribution of issues grouped by maturity classes. Two distinct features 
can immediately be observed; the diminishing number and quantity of short maturity issues 
and the birth of bonds with a maturity exceeding 25 years. This may in part be due to the 
favourable interest rate environment during the latter part of the sample period, but likewise 
evidence of a maturing and broadening market. The development of the European bond 
market is visible in panel 5, which shows the average credit rating in each maturity class 
excluding the unrated issuers. We see that the average numeric credit rating increases, 
denoting lower credit quality, in virtually all maturity classes over time. This is indicative of 
the gradual development of the debt capital markets and its ability to absorb a wider variety 
of debt by issuers of different credit qualities. The phenomenon is especially visible in the 
categories for bonds with a maturity of 10 to 15 years and 15 to 25 years. Interestingly, the 
longest dated bonds start with a higher average credit rating (lower credit quality), which is
7 See appendix 1 for a complete summary of the variables and related data sources. 
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Figure 1 Selected sample statistics presented graphically 
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 in part due to the relatively few bonds belonging to this category, with only 11 issues at 
maturities exceeding 25 years during the entire sample period. For instance, the first column 
in this maturity class corresponds to a single issue made by Olivetti Finance NV, which 
came to the market with a 30-year bond under a BBB/Baa-credit rating, equalling a numeric 
value of four. Nevertheless, issuers of lower investment-grade quality have made the 
inaugural issues of very long-dated bonds8. Another noteworthy characteristic is the increase 
in credit quality (lower numeric rating) in the shortest maturity segment towards the end of 
the sample period, a time characterized by low interest rates and a steep yield curve. This 
may again be indicative of Diamond (1991a) argument that high-quality firms issue short 
when they anticipate beneficial news when coming out of a period of a generally sluggish 
economic environment. Alternatively, the demand for issues by the highest quality firms in 
the longer maturity segments may be low, as investors seek higher yields in assets of lower 
quality firms at times when credit risk premiums are narrow. 
Finally, panel 6 of chart 1 presents the average coupon paid in each maturity class grouped 
by rating categories. It is apparent that longer maturity correlates positively with higher 
coupon payments. This is mostly true for all issues with a credit rating, while the unrated 
category displays a negative correlation. I believe this is a result of the diminishing presence 
of unrated issuers in the market, as we have seen in panel 2, combined with the fact that the 
majority of issues by unrated firms where initially made in the short maturity segments when 
interest rates were high. These unrated issuers paid thus a relatively high coupon for short 
maturity debt, while only a small number of unrated firms secured their funding at lower 
coupon rates when interest rates were lower with a slightly higher maturity. Also note that 
unrated issuers are completely absent from maturity classes exceeding 15 years. Another 
clear feature of the coupon payments is their dramatic increase when credit quality 
deteriorates to speculative-grade segment, a direct consequence of the higher default rates 
recorded for the lower quality credits.  
1.4.2. Summary statistics by reputation categories 
Panels 1 and 2 of table 3 present the average maturity by credit quality and year across the 
different reputation categories. Overall, we see single issuers being more restricted by 
maturity than repeating, infrequent issuers, confirmed in panel 3 by the difference in mean 
test. Issuers deemed frequent issue bonds with comparable average maturity as single issue 
firms. Maturity exhibits thus a humped shape across the reputation categories, which has 
parallels to Diamond (1991a) non-monotonic relationship between credit quality and 
maturity. It would appear that the reputation of an issuer yields similar maturity 
characteristics as credit quality, where the highest category issues short term debt, the middle 
category issues long term debt and the lowest category is screened out of the long term 
segment and forced to issue short. We can also observe that the standard deviation of 
maturity for both infrequent and frequent issuers is higher than for single issuers. Further, we 
note that firms lacking a credit rating issue to shortest maturity debt, except for the single 
observation in the frequent category. Unrated issuers face the highest degree of information 
asymmetry and may try to signal private information about their credit quality by issuing 
short term debt, as suggested by Flannery (1986). 






dev. # Obs. Mean
Std.
dev. # Obs. Mean
Std.
dev. # Obs. Mean
Std. 
dev. # Obs.
Unrated 5.399 2.244 77 5.076 2.094 57 6.123 2.357 19 10.01 0 1
AAA 9.219 5.348 56 6.255 5.97 4 9.82 5.689 28 9.012 4.872 24
AA 8.368 4.225 84 8.006 3.1 11 8.25 3.51 49 8.774 5.855 24
A 7.835 4.882 208 7.22 2.859 33 8.463 5.457 139 5.976 3.259 36
BBB 7.716 6.007 166 6.644 2.825 30 8.714 6.893 86 6.641 5.542 50
BB 7.795 1.836 33 8.232 1.931 22 6.921 1.303 11 . . .
B 8.633 1.818 88 8.685 1.927 58 8.533 1.611 30 . . .
CCC 9.782 0.92 6 9.782 0.92 6 . . . . . .




dev. # Obs. Mean
Std.
dev. # Obs. Mean
Std.
dev. # Obs. Mean
Std. 
dev. # Obs.
1999 7.662 2.833 98 7.326 2.808 31 7.987 2.821 46 7.443 2.954 21
2000 6.768 3.038 95 6.408 2.997 32 7.19 3.185 46 6.303 2.702 17
2001 5.878 2.937 133 5.861 2.177 34 6.251 3.04 69 5.04 3.339 30
2002 6.637 3.877 87 5.171 2.65 24 7.613 4.15 48 5.86 3.925 15
2003 9.954 6.52 134 7.63 2.651 37 10.67 7.073 70 11.29 8 27
2004 8.856 3.817 91 8.788 2.446 35 9.292 4.683 44 7.462 3.482 12
2005 9.103 5.934 80 8.503 1.846 28 10.34 7.92 39 6.696 3.663 13
Total 7.829 4.634 718 7.165 2.783 221 8.435 5.262 362 7.289 5.056 135
Panel 3
Full sample Diff. t-stat Mean
Std.
dev. # Obs. Mean
Std.
dev. # Obs. Mean
Std. 
dev. # Obs.
Single - Freq. -0.124 -0.26 7.165 2.783 221 7.289 5.056 135
Single - Infreq. -1.27 -3.801*** 7.165 2.783 221 8.435 5.262 362
Infreq,- Freq. 1.146 2.222** 8.435 5.262 362 7.289 5.056 135





2 - 6 issues
Frequent Issuers
7 issues or more
Infrequent Frequent IssuersFull sample
Difference in means Single issuers Infrequent
Single issuers
I II VI VII
Table 3 Average maturities by reputation categories 
However, this analysis forgoes the important aspect of overall credit quality. We can read 
into table 3 and conclude that the average credit quality is increasing (decreasing 
numerically) with each reputation category and that the credit rating values for single, 
infrequent and frequent groups are 4.29, 3.27 and 2.84, respectively, ignoring unrated issues. 
I therefore continue the analysis by regression diagnostics to sufficiently exhaust the 
variability in credit quality. 
1.5. Empirical evidence 
Employing the model presented earlier, I evaluate the determinants of debt maturity. 
Columns I through VI in table 4 present results for regressions including the reputation 
variable, macroeconomic variables, controls for quality and issues-specific characteristics.
Column I provides a simple regression with reputation dummies as independent variables, 
where the single-issue category has been dropped. As before, we notice the statistically 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variables for credit quality in column III – with unrated-category being omitted – reinforces 
the earlier finding that the maturity of issued debt follows a hump-shaped form across the 
reputation categories. These results seem to tell that the most frequent issuers actually issue 
the shortest maturity relative to their credit quality.  
Estimated coefficients for macroeconomics variables in columns IIII and VI9 confirm 
previous findings by Guedes and Opler (1996), Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) and 
Bali and Skinner (2006) that firms in the aggregate respond to the level and shape of the 
yield curve10 by shortening the maturity of debt as the slope of the yield curve increases or 
interest rate levels rise. The finding is in contrast with Brick and Ravid (1985) tax-theory, 
which predicts a positive relationship between the maturity of debt and the SLOPE 
coefficient.
SIZE-variable appears positive and significant; interpreting the result by assuming that large 
firms are the most likely candidates to issue sizeable bonds, we can rationalise further that 
the larger the bond issue, the larger the issuing firm and the longer the maturity of issued 
debt. This finding gives indirect support for Myers (1977) proposition that smaller (growth) 
firms issue short term debt to alleviate agency problems, while large, well-established firms 
issue longer debt. Stohs and Mauer (1996) find moderate empirical evidence to support the 
theory. By contrast, Guedes and Opler (1996) use firm size as a control for credit quality and 
attribute their similar finding to Diamond (1991a) model of debt maturity and credit quality, 
where firms of lower quality (smaller size) are screened out of the long-term end of the 
maturity spectrum.  
The annual coupon of an issued bond (COUPON) is significant at a 1% level, implying that 
the market seems concerned with the duration, not necessarily the absolute maturity of the 
issued bond. We observe the effect of including the COUPON variable to the model 
specifications; coefficients for the credit rating dummies are monotonously increasing with 
credit quality in columns with the coupon variable included. The result is obvious; as seen in 
panel 6 of the chart 1, lower quality debt pays a higher coupon to receive funding. Excluding 
the coupon variable from the regression does not relate the cost of funding (coupon cash 
flows) to debt maturity. Indeed, sample statistics show that on average, speculative-grade 
firms issue longer maturity debt than lower investment-grade (A and BBB) firms, while the 
highest quality issuers receive – on average – longest term on their debt.11 However, we wish 
to examine the determinants of debt maturity, where we need to consider the fixed cash 
flows (coupons) that issuers will make over the lifespan of the debt contract in order to 
receive such funding. We notice that the debt maturity is determined significantly by the 
combination of both the credit quality and coupon payments, resulting in the monotonously 
increasing relationship between credit rating and debt maturity. We also notice a 
considerable increase in the adjusted R-squared values. All rating dummies are significant at 
1% in the full model in column VI. In addition, this methodology allows us to observe an 
implied credit quality for the omitted dummy category of firms lacking a credit rating based 
on their position in the maturity spectrum, appearing between low investment-grade (BBB) 
and high speculative-grade credit quality (BB).  
9 Since the dependent variable might not be strictly continuous and clustered around maturities, I performed an 
alternative analysis using an ordered probit regression, where the dependent maturity variable defined by four 
maturity categories (1-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 year and 16+ years). Results are, nevertheless, consistent with 
the reported figures in table 4. 
10 By including the risk premium BBBAAA variable, I lose 32 observations on individual bond issues from the 
regressions, since this data is not available before April 1st, 1999. 
11 Table 3, panel 1 
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Subordinated debt is of longer maturity, as predicted by Diamond (1993). It should be noted 
that all 16 subordinated debt issues were made by speculative-grade issuers, which are more 
likely to default on debt than investment-grade issuers. This behaviour follows likewise 
Diamond’s predictions that junior debt is issued to alleviate liquidation in case of default. 
The robustness of these findings can be seen in the last two columns in table 3, which splits 
the sample period in half. No considerable changes in the significance or signs of the 
variables appear between the two time periods. Also, in separate, unreported regressions I 
limit the sample by excluding 70 issues belonging to the highest maturity decile to ensure 
that results are not driven by outlier observations; sensitivities and signs of all variables 
remain, with the exception of the infrequent category dummy, which shows a reduces 
explanatory power on maturity, while the frequent group is consistently significant. 
1.5.1. Exploring the causality of credit quality and reputation 
Table 5 presents separate regression for unrated, investment-grade (IG) and speculative-
grade (SG) issues. Column III, showing regressions for IG category, reports similar levels of 
significance and sensitivities to regression variables as the full model regression in column I, 
which again is reminiscent of Diamond (1991a)   hump-shaped credit quality and maturity 
relationship. By contrast, we see that the unrated group appears to have a positive coefficient 
for both reputation dummies and that the frequent issuer-dummy is highly significant.12
However, the frequent issuer-dummy is represented by a single observation in the regression 
in column II; one firm issued a single bond in the beginning of the sample period as an 
unrated issuer, but later obtained a credit rating and subsequently issued several bonds 
during the entire sample period, thus being allocated to the highest reputation category.
In addition, each rating category coefficient among the investment-grade issuers appear 
highly significant, consistently following the positive relationship between credit quality and 
maturity, while credit ratings among issuers of speculative-grade are not significantly 
different from each other.
It is also worth noting that the different credit quality groups appear to have varying 
sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions. IG issuers react to changes in the mentioned 
variables more strongly than unrated or SG issuers, similar to the results by Bali and Skinner 
(2006). This is equally true if the frequent issuers group is excluded from the regressions 
(not reported), which would indicate that high quality issuers are more sophisticated than 
unrated or speculative grade issuers in choosing their maturity in response to market 
conditions. Alternatively, it could be argued that IG issuers utilize the capital markets as a 
substitute to bank originated debt when market conditions are favourable, while the two non-
investment-grade groups complement their debt funding on the market, thus disregarding 
market conditions in favour of compensation funding needs.13
1.5.2. Regressions by reputation and the determinants of debt maturity 
Diamond (1991b) suggests that reputation can help deal with problems involving 
information asymmetries. Unlike equity markets, where regulation obligates members to 
reveal information about themselves on a continuous basis, OTC-type bond markets do not 
have direct mechanisms for providing investors with information on a regular basis. As a
12 Recall that the reputation variable consisted of three categories; single, infrequent and frequent issuers. The 
single issuer category has been dropped from the regressions.  
13 Issuers are allocated to their respective categories based on the current rating at the time of issuance.  
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I II III IIII
Independent Variables Full sample Unrated Inv.grade Spec.grade
Slope -0.293*** -0.080 -0.497*** -0.076
[0.039] [0.093] [0.036] [0.047]
Level -0.447*** -0.130* -0.730*** -0.098**
[0.037] [0.078] [0.033] [0.046]
Bbbaaa -0.175*** -0.265* -0.180*** -0.144**
[0.039] [0.156] [0.035] [0.066]
Sub 0.094* . . 0.079**
[0.057] . . [0.039]
Size (LN) 0.102*** 0.002 0.024 0.114**
[0.019] [0.068] [0.016] [0.049]
Bookrun 0.015 0.005 0.001 -0.001
[0.016] [0.048] [0.015] [0.020]
Coupon 0.271*** -0.047 0.555*** 0.073***
[0.023] [0.055] [0.023] [0.022]
Reputation dummies
Infrequent issuer 0.068** 0.079 0.089*** -0.025
[0.033] [0.082] [0.034] [0.040]
Frequent issuer -0.107** 0.355*** -0.079* .
[0.043] [0.120] [0.041] .
Credit rating dummies
AAA 0.705*** . .
[0.077] . .
AA 0.548*** . -0.231*** .
[0.065] . [0.050] .
A 0.310*** . -0.478*** .
[0.059] . [0.045] .
BBB 0.193*** . -0.753*** .
[0.058] . [0.048] .
BB -0.366*** . . .
[0.087] . . .
B -0.865*** . . -0.060
[0.127] . . [0.070]
CCC -1.096*** . . -0.086
[0.186] . . [0.096]
Constant 1.728*** 2.861*** 2.820*** 1.530***
[0.154] [0.519] [0.132] [0.323]
Observations 693 73 494 126
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.31 0.72 0.23
Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level
Dependent Variable : MAT [LN(1+Mat.)]
Table 5 Regressions of MAT by credit quality groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses:  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.  
AAA,…, CCC are dummy variables of corresponding credit rating categories, where the omitted 
base category represents BBB credit quality. Dependent variable MAT is the log of one plus the 
maturity in years. SIZE is the log of the amount of debt issued in euros
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I II III IIII
Full sample Single issuers Infreq. issuers Freq. Issuers
Independent Variables 2 - 6 issues 7 issues or more
Slope -0.284*** -0.133*** -0.442*** -0.336***
[0.039] [0.047] [0.057] [0.075]
Level -0.443*** -0.217*** -0.615*** -0.593***
[0.037] [0.042] [0.055] [0.062]
Bbbaaa -0.178*** -0.214*** -0.195*** -0.169**
[0.040] [0.067] [0.052] [0.071]
Sub 0.088 0.086 0.175 0.000
[0.058] [0.055] [0.136] [0.000]
Size (LN) 0.102*** 0.147*** 0.072*** -0.007
[0.019] [0.037] [0.026] [0.028]
Bookrun 0.018 -0.020 -0.007 0.053*
[0.016] [0.024] [0.021] [0.030]
Coupon 0.272*** 0.098*** 0.395*** 0.504***
[0.023] [0.021] [0.040] [0.045]
Credit rating dummies
AAA 0.680*** 0.156 0.834*** 0.221**
[0.075] [0.270] [0.137] [0.097]
AA 0.545*** 0.442*** 0.586*** 0.037
[0.063] [0.119] [0.127] [0.083]
A 0.324*** 0.234*** 0.381*** -0.273***
[0.057] [0.084] [0.126] [0.087]
BBB 0.181*** 0.126* 0.219* -0.534***
[0.056] [0.070] [0.128] [0.087]
BB -0.355*** 0.103 -0.637*** .
[0.086] [0.087] [0.184] .
B -0.855*** -0.049 -1.550*** .
[0.124] [0.122] [0.254] .
CCC -1.109*** -0.131 . .
[0.186] [0.146] . .
Constant 1.667*** 1.666*** 2.080*** 1.786***
[0.155] [0.260] [0.258] [0.309]
Observations 687 207 352 128
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.76
F 33.53 14.24 15.62 31.47
Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level
Dependent Variable : MAT [LN(1+Mat.)]
Table 6 Regressions of MAT by reputation category. Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
 *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.  
AAA,…, CCC are dummy variables of corresponding credit rating categories, where the omitted 
base category represents BBB credit quality. Dependent variable MAT is the log of one plus the 
maturity in years. SIZE is the log of the amount of debt issued in euros. 
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result, “bondholder value” – a term synonymous with transparency and information content 
specifically directed to debt investors – has made a debut in recent years to cater information 
demands specific to debt investors. For individual debt issuers, reputation may be beneficial 
if it involves bridging information gaps between the issuer and debt investors by repeatedly 
visiting the market with new debt issues and thereby providing the market with firm specific 
information. 
Table 6 presents regression results for each reputation category. The full-sample regression 
results in column I are similar to the ones shown in column VI of table 4, with the exception 
of the SUB-variable which now appears insignificant, although the coefficient is of similar 
magnitude. Each reputation group appears sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic 
environment when choosing their maturity. The variable representing the amount of debt 
issued is significant with a positive sign for all regressions except the highest reputation 
category, consistent with the size-effect in Myers (1977) agency-cost hypothesis. By 
contrast, the BOOKRUN variable is significant only in regressions with frequent issuers. 
The COUPON variable is consistently highly significant and positive.  
Recall that the omitted credit rating category is the unrated group of issuers. In the single-
issuer group, we find less significant differences between the rating dummies. This would 
indicate that firms in this particular group of issuers are unable to obtain significantly 
different maturities on their debt regardless of their credit quality. Or, put in another way, the 
low reputation of these issuers overwhelms their credit quality, restricting differentiation 
between the firms in terms of maturity. Also, the COUPON-variable coefficient is lower 
than in any other reputation group, showing that an incremental increase in coupon payments 
does not increase the maturity of debt as much as for issuers of higher reputation. 
Meanwhile, infrequent issuers, that is, issuers with some reputation in the market are highly 
differentiated by their credit quality.
Interestingly, the BOOKRUN control variable for primary market efficiency appears weakly 
significant with a positive sign in column IIII. This would indicate that the high reputation 
issuers are able to secure longer term on their debt due to a larger sales force when issuing 
debt, a characteristic typical among large firms with many bank relationships to nurture.14
Thus, it would appear that the placement power at issuance has a relative advantage for the 
frequent issuers.
1.5.3. Robustness checks 
Firms of various industry origins might choose their debt maturity differently, leading to 
heterogeneity between industry groups. However, of the total number of 34 industry sectors 
represented in the sample, only nine are present in the frequent issuer category, signifying 
strong variability between industries to issue bonds. Also, table 7 shows that out of these 34 
industries, a cluster of five industry sectors issue half of all the bonds in the sample. The 
industries15 roughly correspond to the sectors classified by Bali and Skinner (2006) as 
having long-term assets on their balance-sheets.  
This inevitably gives rise to questions of whether it is plausible to assume that the issuers 
within each group are homogenous in character or could there exists unobserved 
heterogeneity within an industry groups? Have all firms within industries similar principles 
of funding their business operations and do they have comparable capital structures? Also,  
15 The industry sectors include: “Telecoms/Communications”, “Energy/Utility”, “Automotive”, “Food & 















Telecoms/Communications 109 4.10 1.18 Baa / BBB 15.18 15.18
Energy/Utility 102 2.65 0.75 A / A 14.21 29.39
Automotive 55 3.40 0.97 A / A 7.66 37.05
Food & Drink 48 3.40 1.17 A / A 6.69 43.73
Retailing & Consumer goods 39 3.82 0.98 Baa / BBB 5.43 49.16
Oil, Coal & Gas 37 2.19 1.31 Aa / AA 5.15 54.32
Engineering 36 3.23 1.81 A / A 5.01 59.33
Construction 35 3.53 0.94 Baa / BBB 4.87 64.21
Chemicals 29 3.93 1.49 Baa / BBB 4.04 68.25
Media & Publishing 29 4.61 1.34 Ba / BB 4.04 72.28
Transport & Shipping 29 2.15 1.56 Aa / AA 4.04 76.32
Railways 22 1.62 0.80 Aa / AA 3.06 79.39
Electronics/Electrical 20 3.17 0.86 A / A 2.79 82.17
Forest products/Packaging 16 5.20 1.21 Ba / BB 2.23 84.4
Hotels & Leisure 12 5.09 0.94 Ba / BB 1.67 86.07
Iron & Steel 11 4.83 0.98 Ba / BB 1.53 87.6
Real Estate 10 3.63 0.74 Baa / BBB 1.39 89
Industrials & Conglomerates 8 3.83 1.17 Baa / BBB 1.11 90.11
Luxury goods 8 4.00 0.00 Baa / BBB 1.11 91.23
Consultancies/Agencies/Services 7 5.40 0.89 Ba / BB 0.97 92.2
Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals 7 3.80 1.30 Baa / BBB 0.97 93.18
Textiles & Clothing 7 5.00 1.73 Ba / BB 0.97 94.15
Aerospace 6 3.83 1.17 Baa / BBB 0.84 94.99
Computers/Software 6 6.25 0.50 B / B 0.84 95.8
Public works/Public services 6 4.00 0.00 Baa / BBB 0.84 96.66
Glass & Ceramics 5 6.00 0.00 B / B 0.7 97.35
Metals & Ores 4 5.33 1.15 Ba / BB 0.56 97.91
Agribusiness 3 4.00 1.73 Baa / BBB 0.42 98.33
Mining 3 3.00 2.00 A / A 0.42 98.75
Rubber & Plastics 3 5.00 1.41 Ba / BB 0.42 99.16
Airline 2 3.00 0.00 A / A 0.28 99.44
Manufacturing 2 6.00 0.00 B / B 0.28 99.72
Tobacco 1 4.00 0.00 Baa / BBB 0.14 99.86
Trading & Dealing 1 4 0.00 Baa / BBB 0.14 100
Total 718 100
Table 7 Issue frequency and average credit quality by industry sector 
recall that only a limited number of individual issuers are actually categorised as frequent, 
while the number of issues by members of this category is high, meaning that multiple issues 
by individual firms are present in the regressions of frequent issuers. Could this induce a 
selection bias between the reputation groups? 
To answer these questions, I perform a final set of regressions on the sub-samples of 
frequent and infrequent issuers with firm fixed effects included; table 8 presents the results 
of these regressions, where the similarities with previous regressions are noticeable. 
Macroeconomic variables do not show any significant changes compared with previous 
regressions in table 6. The first apparent difference is the lack of significance for the SIZE-
variable in the sub-groups of the repeating issuers. Secondly, we observe that the 
subordinated debt dummy variable appears significant for the infrequent issuer group, 
supporting theoretical predictions by Diamond (1993) that the maturity of junior debt has 
longer term than senior debt. Third, we observe again a positive and significant BOOKRUN-
variable for in the column IIII representing regressions for the highest reputation group. 
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Firm fixed effects regressions I II III IIII
Full sample Single issuers Infrequent issuers Frequent Issuers
Independent Variables OLS 2 - 6 issues 7 issues or more
Slope -0.425*** -0.119*** -0.405*** -0.417***
[0.071] [0.045] [0.072] [0.074]
Level -0.534*** -0.195*** -0.488*** -0.599***
[0.071] [0.029] [0.070] [0.064]
Bbbaaa -0.232*** -0.153** -0.232*** -0.278***
[0.063] [0.064] [0.068] [0.062]
Sub 0.635*** 0.095 0.607*** .
[0.124] [0.058] [0.113] .
Size (LN) 0.091** 0.205*** 0.081* 0.029
[0.039] [0.032] [0.043] [0.033]
Bookrun -0.003 -0.037 -0.042 0.070**
[0.046] [0.024] [0.046] [0.035]
Coupon 0.363*** 0.070*** 0.298*** 0.484***
[0.061] [0.008] [0.058] [0.047]
Constant 1.937*** 1.432*** 2.479*** 2.032***
[0.255] [0.249] [0.314] [0.277]
Firm dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 693 213 352 128
Number of issuers 356 213 128 15
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.48 0.66 0.77
Robust t statistics in parentheses: 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level
Dependent Variable : MAT [LN(1+Mat.)]
Table 8 Fixed effects regressions of MAT by reputation categories.  
Employed model : MATti = i + 1*LEVELt + 2*SLOPEt + 3*BBBAAAt + 4*COUPONi + 
5*SIZEi + 6*BOOKRUNi + 7*SUBi + 7*Firm dummiesi + i
AAA,…, CCC are dummy variables of corresponding credit rating categories, where the omitted 
base category represents BBB credit quality. Dependent variable MAT is the log of one plus the 
maturity in years. SIZE is the log of the amount of debt issued in euros. 
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1.6. Discussion and conclusions 
The main finding in this paper suggests that repeated bond issues bridge information gaps 
and firms with multiple issues are rewarded with market recognition and increase flexibility 
in choosing the maturity of issued debt.  
Maturity choice is largely dependent on the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. I confirm 
previous by findings by Guedes and Opler (1996), Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) 
and Bali and Skinner (2006) that firms choose the maturity of incremental debt issues with 
changes in the level and slope of the yield curve by shortening the term on debt as short-end 
interest rates or yield curve rise. The result is, however, in contrast with the tax-hypothesis 
by Brick and Ravid (1985), who predicted a positive relationship between the slope of the 
yield and maturity of debt. 
Nevertheless, while this is true in the aggregate, I observe significant variations in the 
sensitivity to these macroeconomic conditions depending on the issuer’s over credit quality, 
which could indicate that issuers of varying credit worthiness utilize the markets in different 
ways; whereas investment-grade issuers are highly responsive to changes in the 
macroeconomic environment, the same is not true from wholly unrated issuers or issuers of 
speculative-grade quality. The latter two may turn to funding from the capital markets when 
other sources of debt capital are exhausted and the need for capital is acute.  
Issuers deemed frequent or infrequent are also of higher credit quality than one-time issuers. 
While Bali and Skinner (2006) find substantial variation in debt maturity within credit 
categories, we have observed that frequent issuers and one-time issuers have a similar 
average maturity of issued debt, but frequent issuers display greater variation on the debt 
maturity for different qualities of credit. Thus, variability in maturity is not only conditional 
on credit quality alone, but also related to the reputation of an issuer.
Unlike investment-grade issuers, the frequency of issue bears no effect on the speculative-
grade issuers, who do not see an increase in the variability of debt maturity for more frequent 
issuers. It would also appear that the most frequent, good quality issuers are not inclined to 
extend their debt maturity through bond markets. The frequent use of bond markets as a 
source of debt capital may be a result of firm specific funding policies, but these firms seem 
to consider the general economic conditions a as a prominent driver of maturity choice. By 
contrast, infrequent issuers seek the longest maturities in the market and similar to single 
issuers, they time the market by altering their debt maturity according to prevailing 
economic conditions. It may be that firms in the infrequent group have knowingly set out to 
build a reputation, in order to access the longer term on debt available in the capital markets. 
Subordination of debt is issued with a longer maturity than senior debt. Similar to theoretical 
predictions by Diamond (1993), issuers of subordinated debt are of lower credit qualities, 
thus at a higher risk of default and a possible liquidation, which the lower debt status seeks 
to alleviate. The European capital markets have also had an increasing appetite for lower 
credit qualities and I have documented the growth of the so called junk bond market in 
Europe.
Finally, I contribute to previous literature by showing that controlling for coupon payments 
yields a monotonically decreasing risk-maturity relationship, whereas omitting this control 
produces on non-monotonic relationship between credit quality and debt maturity similar to 
Diamond (1991a). While speculative-grade quality firms issue on average longer term debt 
than lower investment-grade issuers, they are screened out of the longest maturity segments 
due to increased costs in terms of annualised coupon payments.  
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I have also shown that the implied credit quality of issuers without a credit rating lies on the 
edge of speculative-grade and investment-grade credit quality. An interesting extension to 
the presented empirical evidence would be to assess whether the lack of a credit rating alone 
determines the debt maturity available to these issuers or whether the term of debt for 
unrated issuers is driven by firm-specific characteristics, which the market correctly 
recognises. If the first alternative would turn out to be true, it would be a strong signal of the 
significance of credit rating agencies as agents in bridging gaps in information asymmetries 
on the debt capital markets.  
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APPENDIX 1 VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Data description Intervall Data source
BOOKRUN Number of financial insitutionals (bookrunners) involved in the 
sale of a given issue.
Per issue Dealogic
COUPON Annualized fixed coupon of a given issue. Per issue Dealogic
MAT Log of one plus the maturity in years of given issue, calculated 
as the difference between the closing date and the final 
maturity date of a that issue.
Per issue Dealogic
RATING Category variable for credit ratings. For split rating an average 
rating is calculated based on the assigned values. See table 
Per issue Dealogic
SIZE Log of the total size denominated in million euros of a given 
issue .
Per issue Dealogic
SUB Category variable, indicating if the debt issued has junior 
status. Has a value of 1 if subordinated, 0 otherwise.
Per issue Dealogic
LEVEL 3 month euribor rates Monthly European central bank
SLOPE Yield difference between 10 year harmonized goverment bond 
and 3 month euribor rate. Bond yields are quoted mid-month 
and represent the average yield calculated on the basis of 
harmonised national government bond yields weighted by the 
nominal outstanding
Monthly European central bank
BBBAAA Yield difference between market indices for BBB-rated and 
AAA-rated bonds.




RIDING A ROLLERCOASTER OR THE MERRY-GO-ROUND? 
MARKET TIMING AND THE CHOICE OF INTEREST RATE 
EXPOSURE ON CORPORATE DEBT 
Abstract
This paper examines the original interest rate exposure of debt for incremental corporate 
debt issues in the absence of derivatives. I find that firms time their interest exposure with 
market movements and show that the maturity of debt is by far the strongest driver for the 
choice of debt type. In addition, my results follow model predictions by Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), who suggests higher portions of fixed rate debt when interest rates are 
below their long-term averages, a strong characteristic of the post-Euro times.  
Keywords: interest rate exposure, market timing, macroeconomic, corporate bonds, debt 
maturity, credit quality  
JEL Classifications: G15, G32
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1.1. Introduction 
This paper examines the determinants for the original interest rate exposure on incremental 
corporate debt issues. Choosing between fixed or floating rate debt constitutes a fundamental 
decisions in a firm’s funding management; the interest rate exposure on issued debt is a 
critical risk component on corporate balance sheets and different interest rate environments 
may provide firms with various opportunities to fund themselves cost efficiently by choosing 
an appropriate interest rate exposure.
Previously, the literature has been preoccupied studying the use of derivatives and arguing 
what final risk exposure firms ought to have1, although many authors have reported that the 
use of derivates and their effect in risk management may be rather limited. Covitz and 
Sharpe (2005) find that larger firms tend not to limit their interest rate exposure through the 
use of derivatives, but by structuring their initial debt exposure to achieve a desired end 
result. Guay and Kothari (2003) study whether financial derivatives are an economically 
important component of corporate risk management and find evidence to suggest that the 
magnitude of the derivatives positions held by most firms is economically small in relation 
to their risk exposures. They note that “the median firm holds derivative securities that could 
hedge only 3% to 6% of its aggregate interest rate and currency exchange rate exposures.”
A qualitative survey among US chief financial officers conducted by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) shows that interest rate timing is important factor when firms are preparing debt 
issues.2
Meanwhile, Faulkender (2005) studies the hedging and market-timing behaviour of firms by 
considering the final interest rate exposure of both bank and market originated debt. The 
study reveals that among the corporate bonds included in the studied sample, only 7% were 
actually swapped in order to alter the interest exposure of the original issue. Faulkender finds 
that firms do engage in market timing through the use of derivatives but do not hedge cash-
flows.
Thus, there appears to be a void in the current empirical literature and it would seem 
reasonable to study specifically the drivers affecting the original interest rate exposure of 
debt sans derivative-instruments. The choice of studying the initial debt type of incremental 
debt issues on the Euro-denominated capital market is therefore motivated by several factors; 
first, focusing my study on the original interest rate exposure of market-based debt yields 
also a greater insight into how firms approach and tap the debt capital market under different 
interest rate environments. Second, this approach provides straightforward evidence on firm 
risk-management strategies on a market absent of bank monitoring. Third, my sample of 
transaction-level observations, as opposed to measurements and proxies on entity-wide debt 
structure, produces well-defined and verifiable points in time at which an issue has been 
launch under specific interest rate regimes and with accurate descriptions on the 
characteristics of individual debt issues. Fourth, by effectively utilising data at hand, I am 
able to include variables motivated by the theoretical literature to control for the 
1 See e.g. Covitz and Sharpe (2005), A. Purnanandam (2004), J. R. Graham and D. A. Rogers (2002) and G. W. 
Fenn, M. Post, and S. A. Sharpe (1996) for cross-industry studies on the determinants of firms’ use of 
derivatives and Michael Faulkender (2005), G. D. Haushalter (2000), and P. Tufano (1996) for industry-
specific studies. Wayne Guay and S. P. Kothari (2003)examine the quantitative relevance of firms’ derivatives 
holdings. 
2 Critique has also been raised about the literatures tendency to label only those using derivatives as hedgers, 
while interest rate risk management is certainly considered even in the absence of derivative instruments (see 
e.g. M. A. Petersen and S. R. Thiagarajan (2000).) However, the approach adopted in this paper identifies the 
choice of interest exposure from a cost efficiency perspective, much like responses suggests in the survey by 
John R. Graham and Campbell R. Harvey (2001) 
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heterogeneous characteristics of the bond issues. And finally, the adopted approach allows 
for a sample size considerably larger in cross-section than in the Faulkender (2005) study, 
which is limited to a single industry sector. To the best of my knowledge, there are no 
similar studies to be found in the current empirical literature. 
Results show that the maturity of debt is by far the strongest driver for the choice of debt 
type; longer term to maturity increases the likelihood of fixed rate debt. Further, firms do 
time the market, although I find evidence of timing behaviour which is partly opposite to 
previously reported findings by both Faulkender (2005) and Vickery (2005). My results 
follow, however, model predictions by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), who suggests higher 
portions of fixed rate debt when interest rates are below their long-term averages, a strong 
characteristic of the post-Euro times.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 review related theoretical and empirical 
literature. Section 3 presents the research methodology, while section 4 provides an 
overview of the data utilised in the study and definitions for relevant variables. Empirical 
results are given in section 5, including various robustness checks. In section 6 I discuss 
some of the results and finally, section 7 gives conclusions on the findings in this paper. 
1.2. Review of related literature 
Floating-rate debt represents essentially a security consisting of consecutive short-term 
contracts priced with the same credit risk premium over the entire lifespan of the agreement, 
but adjusted periodically for the underlying interest rate movements, while a fixed rate 
contract locks the periodical coupon payments of the contract until maturity. The choice 
between the two may be driven by firms trying to time the market, that is, firms borrow 
floating-rate debt when the perceived cost of borrowing floating-rate debt is lower than the 
fixed rate debt and vice-versa. Thus, according to a general market-timing view, when the 
yield spread between long and short-term debt increases, firms are more likely to borrow 
floating-rate debt. A qualitative survey among US chief financial officers conducted by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) shows that interest rate timing is important factor when firms are 
preparing debt issues. 
Choosing a particular interest rate exposure may also be a way of signalling firm quality. 
Guedes and Thompson (1995) develop a model in which the riskier choice of debt signals 
favourable news about firm quality. Their model does not associate the level of risk as being 
explicitly higher for floating or fixed rate debt per se, but rather, either security type can 
increase the likelihood of financial distress depending on the relationship between expected 
real rates and inflation volatility. Fixed rate debt is preferred when real market interest rates 
fluctuate more relative to inflation, while times characterised by relatively higher expected 
inflation volatility favours floating rate debt. Bearing floating rate debt during periods of 
higher inflation volatility stabilises operating income after interest expenses, since the 
inflation component is reflected both in gross operating income and nominal interest rate 
expenses payable by firms. Thus, choosing debt that is destabilising cash-flows and therefore 
riskier is considered a signalling superior firm quality. Flannery (1986) creates a model 
based on information asymmetries in which frequent refinancing of debt incurs costs. Short-
term and more information sensitive debt is issued by firms trying to signal their quality, 
while firms unable to pay these transaction costs issue long term debt and are perceived to be 
lower quality. Building on the Flannery’s (1986) work, Titman (1992) presents a model 
where interest rate uncertainty subjects firms to greater likelihood of financial distress. An 
increase in interest rate volatility may induce firms to issue long-term debt despite otherwise 
preferring to issue short-term debt due to reasons of information asymmetry.  
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Research on the predictive power of the term structure of interest rates is vast and rich on 
many models and empirical studies explaining the relationship between yield curve 
movements and economic conditions (see e.g. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Campbell 
(1995), Estrella (2005).) Building empirical work on these theories, Faulkender (2005) 
examines the final interest rate exposure for firms in the chemical industry and finds that i) 
firms choose fixed rate exposure when economic conditions are expected to worsen, ii) firms 
engage in market timing through the use of derivatives but do not hedge cash-flows; and iii) 
the slope of the yield curve at the time of the debt issue determines whether firms use 
interest rate swaps to alter the interest rate exposure of their debt. In a similar study, Vickery 
(2005) examines the interest rate exposure choices of small firms and finds evidence 
suggesting that high real interest rates and a steep yield curve are correlated with a lower 
proportion of fixed debt. Vickery (2005) also reports that small loans, which he considers a 
proxy for firm size, are more likely to be fixed rate loans. 
Other empirical studies have examined the floating rate share of firms’ liability structure: 
Chava and Purnanandam (2007) examine how managerial incentives affect the ratio of 
floating rate debt. While their sample of firms include only of a small number of firms with 
public debt issues, they report that smaller firms with more valuable growth options and 
closer to financial distress adopt conservative debt financing strategy by maintaining lower 
levels of floating-rate debt, similar to Vickery (2005). By contrast Covitz and Sharpe (2005) 
find that smaller, lower-rated firms tend to have greater initial interest rate exposures on their 
total liabilities compared with larger firms and that larger firms tend not to limit their interest 
rate exposure through the use of derivatives, but by structuring their debt directly to fit 
desired risk exposure strategies. However, the public capital market in itself is not an arena 
open to every firm. Cantillo and Wright (2000) develop a model to predict how firms choose 
their lenders. They show empirically that larger, more transparent firms tap the public debt 
markets, whereas smaller firms are limited to the bank market. Similarly, Diamond (1991) 
shows that higher quality firms issue public debt, while firms of lower credit worthiness 
access debt funding through banks acting as monitoring lenders. Faulkender (2005) provides 
evidence that larger, more profitable firms are more likely to issue fixed rate debt, while 
smaller, less profitable firms issue floating rate debt. Faulkender (2005) argues that this is 
partly dependent on market segmentation, where only larger firms are able to access public 
markets to issue fixed rate debt, while smaller firms are restricted to floating rate bank debt. 
The paper provides an alternative explanation that fixed rate debt is more expensive and 
smaller, less profitable firms prefer to bear the interest rate risk associated with the less 
expensive floating rate debt. 
The term to maturity of debt is also reflected in the choice of interest rate exposure. 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) derive a model for valuing floating and fixed rate debt, 
which considers both the likelihood of default for risky debt and interest rate risks. They 
show that a floating-rate payment can be less valuable in the short term and that the value 
can be an increasing function of the time until payment when interest rates are below their 
average long-run levels. This in turn implies that floating rate debt is less favourable than 
fixed rate debt during periods of low interest rate, since floating rate payments are valued 
lower relative to fixed rate payments.  
1.3. Research strategy 
Previous research suggests that using derivatives to alter interest rate exposure is limited 
(Guay and Kothari (2003)) and larger firms, with access to capital markets, generally issue 
debt which directly fits their risk management strategies (Covitz and Sharpe (2005).)  
Therefore, it seems motivated to study explicitly the determinants of the original interest 
exposure of newly issued debt. By examining incremental debt issues, I am able to study a 
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wide cross-section of issues over a long time-period and by focusing on market-based debt, I 
gain insight into how firms access the debt capital market under different interest rate 
environments. The strength of the incremental debt approach lies in that individual 
observations on debt are exact and easily identified in time, while a weakness may be the 
wide variation in debt issue characteristics. As a result, my model includes variables to 
control for the varying characteristics of the bonds in the final sample. Focusing solely on 
bond issues, as I do, has another weakness in that it evades the issue of dealing with the 
overall interest rate exposures of individual firms. While the argument is true in part, it 
undermines the value of understanding how directly place debt is utilised by firms. By 
concentrating on this particular segment of debt, I am able to study a wide range of debt 
issues, compared with many earlier studies on narrow samples or pooled estimates on 
liability structures. The obvious shortcomings of the incremental approach should therefore 
be more than outweighed by the new insight into firms’ issuance behaviour on the European 
debt capital market. Thus, I examine the determinants of the original interest rate exposure 
by performing bivariate analysis on the choice of debt type under varying macroeconomic 
conditions with controls for both firm quality and various issue specific characters. 
The dependent variable is dichotomous, with a value of 1 if debt is issued as floating rate and 
0 if it is fixed. In my analysis, I consider the slope of the yield curve and the short-end level 
of interest rates as my primary macroeconomic variables. These variables convey 
information about the current state of the economy and provide indicators of future 
economic activity (see e.g. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Campbell (1995), Estrella 
(2005).) If the macroeconomic environment affects a firm’s choice of debt, these variables 
should capture such behaviour. I also include a variable for market credit-risk premiums, 
since investor’s credit risk appetite tends to change over time, which is translated to 
fluctuations in funding costs for individual firms. The credit risk-premium variable is 
defined as the average credit spread between AAA-rated and BBB-rated corporate bonds.
Higher degree of uncertainty about the future state of the economy increases the likelihood 
of financial distress and may as a consequence affect the choice of interest rate exposure. To 
quantify potential sources of uncertainty firms may face in their considerations for debt type, 
I include variables on inflation, short-term interest rate volatility and the volatility of 10-year 
interest rate swaps as suggested by models by Titman (1992) and Guedes and Thompson 
(1995). I use daily observations of ten-year interest rate swaps to estimate monthly volatility 
as a measure of future uncertainty. Choosing swap data for the volatility measure instead of 
corresponding government bond data is motivated by the fact that the European bond 
markets use interest rate swaps as the standard benchmark yield curve for non-sovereign 
bond issues (see e.g. Danthine, Giavazz and Thadden (2000) and Casey and Lannoo (2005)). 
Data on interest rate swaps is also more reliable due to the high liquidity of the swap market, 
compared with the alternative of using synthetically constructed sets of daily bond yield 
data.
Unlike previous empirical studies, I include the maturity of debt as a variable in the model as 
suggested by Guedes and Thompson (1995)3. Bridging together Titman’s (1992) argument 
of signalling through interest rate sensitive debt with predictions by Flannery (1986) that 
higher quality firms issue shorter maturity debt to signal their quality with, suggests that 
longer maturity debt is more likely issued with fixed coupon payments, while higher quality 
firms issue floating-rate, short-term debt.  
3 The model given by J. Guedes and R. Thompson (1995) argues that a positive correlation between firms’ 
cash-flows and interest rates favours floating rate debt. However, as debt maturity increases the long-run 
correlation may be less obvious and fixed rate is preferred. While their own empirical work lacks controls for 
debt maturity, the authors note that maturity is a possible determinant of the choice interest rate exposure. 
6
Other issue specific variables include in the model are issue size, the credit quality of the 
firm and term to maturity of the issued debt and industry sectors. If firms are trying to signal 
their superior quality by issuing interest rate sensitive debt, the expectance would be that 
lower quality firms issue more fixed rate debt than high quality issuers. By contrast, Covitz 
and Sharpe (2005) find evidence that larger firms issue proportionally more fixed rate debt, 
assuming that issue sizes are related to firm size.  
1.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
My data set originates from the Dealogic database, containing issue-specific information on 
Euro-denominated bond issues made by EMU-country residents from January 1st, 1999 to 
November 31st, 2006.  The study is restricted to include debt issued by non-financial firms; 
excluding the financial sector allows a better comparison with earlier empirical literature, 
which has focused almost exclusively on non-financial firms. 
Raw data comprises 14.902 observations. I eliminate issues by government4, supranationals, 
financial institutions and any linked category based on the issuer type and issuer industry 
coded in the database. I further exclude collateralized or covered bonds; bonds with various 
embedded option-features; subordinated bonds; currency-, inflation- or index-linked bonds; 
bonds with uneven payment schedules; tap-issues5; and other irregular features as noted in 
the database. Unclear entries are cross-referenced with the Thomson ONE Banker database 
and internet sources when available.  Incomplete or missing records are excluded from the 
final sample, which consists of 1353 plain vanilla bond-issues by 423 individual non-
financial corporate EMU-residents6. I use the date of the public announcement to identify a 
bond to a specific month in the sample period.  
Data on interest rates representing the yield curve is obtained from the European Central 
Bank (ECB). All yields are monthly averages and weighted by the nominal outstanding 
amounts of national government bonds in each maturity band. The slope of the yield curve is 
defined as the difference between 10-year government bonds and the 3-month Euribor rate. 
Annual inflation data is provided by Eurostat. Monthly volatility (annualized standard 
deviation) measures are calculated from log changes in respective daily quotes on 3-month 
and 12-month Euribor rates and 10-year interest rate swaps obtained from Reuters.  
International Index Company produces iBoxx bond-indices, which I use for calculation of 
the credit risk premium between AAA- and BBB-category investment-grade bonds. iBoxx-
data is available from April 1st 1999 onwards.  
A credit rating by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s or both has been assigned to 1244 of the 
1353 bonds in the sample. I recode the rating categories with integer numbers in ascending 
order, where the highest AAA/Aaa-rating is coded as “1” and the lowest CCC/Caa is coded 
as “7”. For issues with split ratings, a composite rating is calculated corresponding to an 
average of the values of the separate ratings assigned by the rating agencies. Unrated issues 
4 Debt issues, which have been granted a state-guarantee of repayment, are also excluded. 
5 Tap-issues are re-issues of a bond, executed in varying amounts and at different times, usually in response to 
investor demand. The main terms of the bond (issuing conditions, coupon and maturity) remain unchanged, but 
the issue price can vary according to market conditions. Tap-issues on bonds are thus left outside the sample, 
since they would induce a bias as the same bond appears multiple times in the sample. 
6 All non-financial corporate issuer residing within the EMU-area are considered; Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece (2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. However, 
issuers in related colonies or territories to EMU countries, such as the French Polynesia or the Netherlands 
Antilles are omitted. On the other hand, issues by subsidiaries to other than EMU-residents are left in the 
sample; e.g., Toyota’s European arm, Toyota Motor Finance BV located in the Netherlands belongs to the final 
sample. 
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are coded as zero. The rating scales, corresponding values and issue frequencies are shown 
in table 1.
Moody's Standard & Poor's Value Obs. # fixed # floating
Aaa AAA Investment-grade 1 117 66 51
Aa AA quality 2 156 102 54
A A 3 558 243 315
Baa BBB 4 279 196 83
Ba BB Speculative-grade 5 42 36 6
B B quality 6 85 80 5
Caa CCC 7 7 5 2
Ca CC 8 0 . .
C C 9 0 . .
D D 10 0 . .
- - Unrated issuers 0 109 84 25
Total 1,353 812 541
Rating agency
Table 1 Credit rating categories. Credit rating categories and their corresponding numerical values, with 
observations frequencies by debt type.
Firms in the sample are represented by 34 different industry sectors. For later regression 
diagnostics, I compose four super-categories based on industry definitions by Fama and 
French (F&F)7.  The original F&F-industry classification includes five industry categories 
(Consumer/Wholesale/Retail, Manufacturing/Energy/Utility, High-technology, Healthcare 
and Other), but due to a small number of issues by relevant firms in the “Healthcare” 
category, I merge it with the “Other” category, resulting in a total of four super-categories, 
named hereafter in short Consumer, Manufacturing, Hitech and Other. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the regression variables. Panel 1 shows central 
statistics for macroeconomic variables observed at monthly intervals. The slope of the yield 
curve remains positive throughout the sample period, while the short-end interest rate 
variable Level corresponding to the 3m Euribor rate has fluctuated between a low of 2.03 
(March 2004) and a high of 5.09 (November 2000) over the sample period. Data for the 
credit risk variable Bbbaaa is only available from April 1999 onwards, resulting in 92 
monthly observations until November 2006. The second panel in table 2 displays the issues-
specific variables by issue-type and reports results for a difference in means test in column 
IIII. Consistent with findings by Covitz and Sharpe (2005), debt issues with fixed coupon 
payments are significantly larger in size compared to floating rate issues. The average credit 
quality score excluding unrated (zero coded) issuers is higher for fixed rate issuers, 
indicating a lower firm quality among issuers of fixed rate debt. We notice also that fixed 
rate issues have a longer term to maturity. These observations follow Flannery’s (1986) and 
Titman’s (1992) predictions that both longer term and fixed rate debt tend to be of lower 
credit quality. Panel 3 presents annual statistics for selected variables. Columns I and II show 
the average amount issued in Euros and the number of issues in brackets for fixed and 
floating rate debt, respectively. The cumulative size of fixed rate issues is consistently larger 
than floating rate issues, while there are two years – 2004 and 2006 – during which the 
number of floating rate issues exceeded that of fixed rate issues. Inflation rose in the 
beginning of the sample period, but settled then to levels slightly above 2%. Meanwhile, the 
market credit-risk premium nearly doubled from an annual average of 0.852 in 1999 to 1.593 
in 2002 in the midst of corporate scandals and high profile bankruptcies, but narrowed again 
sharply towards the end of the sample period. Finally, panel 4 presents a correlation matrix












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 for the independent variables. Correlation among the macroeconomic variables is to some 
extent high, but their corresponding variance inflator factor (VIF)-values do not indicate 
multicollinearity problems8.
1.5. Empirical Results 
This section examines the empirical findings from testing the model presented earlier. The 
first series of regressions in table 3 examines the model in varying compositions. I perform a 
range of robustness checks to verify findings and detail results for each regression 
specification. I discuss and interpret the results at the end of this paper. 
Table 3 presents regression results for various model specifications. An immediate 
observation is the highly significant and negative coefficients obtained for the 
macroeconomic variables Level and Slope. This result is in sharp contrast with expectations 
and findings by Faulkender (2005) and Vickery (2005), who both found a positive 
relationship between these macroeconomic variables and the likelihood of floating rate debt9.
Regression results also show that the debt maturity variable is a highly significant 
determinant for the type of debt.. As expected, the obtained coefficient for the maturity 
variable is negative, indicating that increasing maturity decreases the likelihood of floating 
rate debt, following predictions by both Guedes and Thompson (1995) and Titman (1992). 
By comparing columns III and IIII we see the impact of adding the maturity variable to the 
regression specification, which increases the pseudo R-squared value from 0.003 to 0.425. 
While the pseudo R-squared cannot be directly compared to similar figure familiar in linear 
regression models, it does suggest that the maturity of debt improves the fit of the model and 
that it is an important determinant for the choice of interest rate exposure.
Also in line with expectations, we observe the Size variable appearing statistically 
significant with a negative sign, meaning that larger issues are more likely to issued as fixed 
rate debt, consistent with findings by Faulkender (2005) and Covitz and Sharpe (2005), but 
in contrast with Vickery (2005). The dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if an issuer 
has a credit rating and 0 otherwise, has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
implying that rated, and thus more transparent firms are more likely to issue floating rate 
debt, while unrated issuers prefer fixed rate. It could be argued that unrated issuers are of 
generally lower credit or they are opaque firms, sporadically tap the public capital market to 
access fixed rate debt as an alternative source for bank driven floating rate funding. The 
other macroeconomic control variables do not appear significant.10
1.5.1. Robustness checks with fixed effects 
The employed approach of studying incremental debt issues overlooks firm specific 
characteristics, which are not included in the model. For instance, candidate variables could 
be the targeted ratio of fixed-to-floating rate debt, firm size, total debt to assets, and a 
8 VIF values exceeding 10 or 20 are considered indicative of multicollinearity problems, depending on the 
school of thought (see e.g. W. Greene (2003), G. S. Maddala (1992).) 
9 Recall that the slope variable represents the term spread for government bonds. Corporate bond issues in the 
Euro-area are commonly priced against interest rate swaps, due to higher liquidity of swaps and thus better 
suitability as a benchmark (see e.g. G. R. Duffee (1996), Danthine, Giavazz, and Thadden (2000), John Hull, 
Mirela Predescu, and Alan White (2004) and J. P. Casey and K. Lannoo (2005)). However, changing the slope 
variable in the regression to correspond to the swap term spread does not materially alter the magnitude, sign or 
significance of estimated coefficients (results not reported). 
10 I loose 21 observations when the market credit risk premium variable is included, since this data is available 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































measure of the interest rate sensitivity of a firm’s cash flows11. That is, some of the results 
may be driven by unobserved firm characteristics, which could produce a bias in the 
estimated coefficients. Assuming that such unobserved firm characteristics are relatively 
constant over time, we can curb the problem by introducing fixed effects to the model. 
Regressions with industry- and firm-level fixed effects are thus presented in table 4. A word 
of caution is in place regarding the “excessive” use of dummies to capture fixed-effects in 
probit regressions. Generally, fixed-effect probit regressions have been deemed to produce 
biased estimates (see e.g. Baltagi (2001); Greene (2003); Hsiao (2003).), although Heckman 
and Macurdy (1980) shows by means of Monte Carlo simulation that the estimated 
parameters in fixed-effects probit regressions behave well and are close to their true values, 
while Greene (2003) adds that the use of fixed-effects regressions have attractive practical 
properties despite some statistical shortcomings. To curb some of these weaknesses in 
regression with probit models, I estimate fixed-effects regressions by utilising a linear 
probability model (LPM) regressions, thus following Vickery (2005). Of course, LPM 
method is not a perfect alternative either for performing regression with a dichotomous 
dependent variable, since the model cannot constrain probabilities to the [0-1] interval. 
While the presented methods represent a somewhat naïve approach, it should sufficiently 
prove the robustness of the estimated coefficients. The first column in table 4 presents results 
where only credit rating dummies12 are included and the subsequent two columns report 
estimated coefficients with additional industry13  and firm dummies14 , respectively. As in 
previous regressions, we observe statistical significance for the interest rate variables with 
negative signs in all of the regressions in table 4. When firm fixed effects are included, the 
statistical significance for interest rate variables deteriorates slightly. Maturity and Size 
variables are also consistently significant for all regression specification.  In addition, we see 
hardly any variation in the adjusted R-squared values, indicating that the unobserved firm 
characteristics captured in fixed effects do not increase the fit of the model. The significance 
and explanatory power of the presented variables appear robust in the presence of both 
industry- and firm-specific fixed effects. 
Results from modifications on the regression model with firm fixed effects are presented in 
the last two columns of table 4, including only the interest rate variables in both presence 
and absence of the maturity variable. If we are still assuming that the firm fixed effects can 
capture much of firm specific characteristics, column IIII highlights results that conform to 
those reported by Faulkender (2005), with positive signs appearing in front of the interest 
rate coefficients. In other words, a higher interest rate level and a steeper yield curve would 
increase the likelihood of floating rate debt. With firm-level dummies included, this naïve 
model help explain some 27% of the variation in the dependent variable.15
11 Guedes and Thompson  argue that cash flow sensitivity is a determinant of interest rate exposure. Faulkender  
includes the variable in his model, but reports insignificant predictability for the variable.  
12 The previously reported dummy variable indicating whether an issue is rated is not included anymore, since 
credit rating dummies are now included. The dummy representing the unrated issuers is dropped from the 
regressions. 
13 Regression in columns II includes a full set of 33 industry dummies, with one category dropped. 
14 The sample includes issues by 423 individual firms. 




Independent Variables I II III IIII V
Interest rate variables
Level -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.063** 0.015 -0.079***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.026] [0.027] [0.023]
Slope -0.077*** -0.083*** -0.062* 0.015 -0.070**
[0.022] [0.022] [0.033] [0.038] [0.031]
Issue characteristics
Maturity (LN) -0.471*** -0.483*** -0.433*** . -0.489***
[0.020] [0.022] [0.032] . [0.029]
Size (LN) -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.075*** . .
[0.012] [0.013] [0.019] . .
Macro economic controls
Bbbaaa -0.022 -0.031 -0.017 . .
[0.031] [0.031] [0.043] . .
Inflation -0.025 -0.025 -0.015 . .
[0.025] [0.025] [0.036] . .
3m Euribor volatility -0.093 -0.103 -0.231 . .
[0.165] [0.167] [0.221] . .
10y swap volatility -0.410 -0.293 -0.227 . .
[0.294] [0.296] [0.409] . .
Constant 1.901*** 2.093*** 1.794*** -0.106 1.357***
[0.116] [0.159] [0.229] [0.209] [0.187]
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies . Yes . . .
Firm dummies . . Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1322 1322 1322 1353 1353
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.27 0.48
Robust standard errors (White(1980)) in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dichotomous dependent variable: Floating 0/1
Table 4 Examining the Determinants of Debt Type with Fixed Effects. Linear probability model (OLS) 
regressions. 
However, negative coefficients return with the inclusion of the maturity variable to the 
model and adjusted R-square values increase substantially to 0.48. Apparently the maturity 
variable is an important determinant of the interest rate exposure, but we are also faced with 
a potential new problem, namely that of endogeneity. 
1.5.2. Dealing with endogeneity 
So far, I have emphasised the role of the negative slope coefficient, which has remained in 
focus due to the opposite results found by Faulkender (2005) and Vickery (2005). However, 
this paper introduces the maturity of debt as a determinant of interest rate exposure. Results 
have shown that the variable has a highly significant impact on whether a firm’s choice is 
floating or fixed rate debt. This also gives raise to a potential bias in the results, due to the 
fact that the choice of interest rate exposure and the maturity of debt are most likely jointly 
determined. That is, we are unable to distinguish the causality between the two; is the 
maturity driving the choice of interest rate exposure on newly issued debt or vice versa? 
Also, the model might still suffer from an omitted variable bias, since we are unable to 
observe all underlying firm characteristics. That is, if unobserved firm characteristics change 
over time, contrary to the assumptions in the fixed effects regressions, we are again faced 
with an endogeneity problem. 
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Dealing with the issue is not straight forward. To ease the potential bias described above, we 
would need to find an instrumental variable that is correlated with the potentially 
endogenous maturity variable, but uncorrelated with the independent variable. I argue that a 
suitable instrument could be found in a variable describing the number of financial 
institutions involved in the sale of a given bond issue. This variable can also be interpreted 
as the primary market efficiency, or placing power, of an issue. It is reasonable to assume 
that the longer the term to maturity of an issue is, the more difficult it is to place in the 
market place. Or, corollary, more placing power is needed to successfully issue a bond of 
lengthier term to maturity in the market. On the other hand, it is less clear why a link should 
exist between the choice of fixed or floating rate debt and the number of book-runners of an 
issue. Therefore, I deem such a variable suitable as an instrument for the following analysis.  
Probit regression Dep.var. Dep.var.
with instrumental variable Maturity (LN) Floating
First-stage Second-stage










Maturity (LN)       hat . -2.656***
. [0.110]







3m Euribor volatility 0.347 -0.062
[0.257] [0.684]








Robust standard errors (White(1980)) in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5 Instrumental variable regressions under probit. Instrumented by Bookrun-variable.
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Table 5 details the results of probit regressions with the instrumental variable16. As noted, 
the Bookrun variable is defined as number of financial institutions involved in the sale of a 
given issue. Column one presents the first stage regression, where the endogenous maturity 
variable is regressed against the exogenous variables and the instrument. Column two reports 
in turn regressions with the familiar dichotomous dependent variable on the exogenous 
variables and fitted values for the maturity. A Wald test of exogeneity is also reported, where 
the null is that the variable is exogenous. We can easily reject the null and conclude that the 
maturity variable was endogenous. 
The interest rate variables still appear statistically highly significant and negative in column 
II. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients does not vastly differ from previously 
reported. Fitted values for the maturity variable are also significant, while the Size variable 
bears no longer a statistical significance. This is not entirely surprising, since sizeable bonds 
are more often fixed rate and of longer maturity, as was seen in table 2. Hence, the effect 
was captured in the first stage regression in column one and neutralized in the second stage 
regression.
1.5.3. Robustness over credit qualities 
In the following section I explore whether the quality of the firm bears relevance to issuance 
behaviour and the choice of interest rate risk exposure. We have seen earlier in table 3 that 
an assigned credit rating has a significant impact on the choice of debt; rated firms, deemed 
more transparent, are more likely to issue floating rate debt. On the other hand, panel 2 in 
table 2 showed that the average credit quality (excluding unrated issuers) is significantly 
lower among fixed rate issuers.  
Table 6 details the results where the sample is split by credit quality super-categories into 
‘Unrated’, ‘Investment-grade’ and ‘Speculative-grade’ issuers. The interest rate variables 
appear negative and significant only for investment grade issuers, while the Slope coefficient 
for speculative-grade issuers is insignificant.  
Regressions performed on a sub-sample of unrated issuers display insignificant estimates for 
both interest rate variables, suggesting that unrated firms are not timing the market in any 
respect. Interestingly, increases in inflation seem to tilt unrated issues towards fixed rate 
debt, but it would seem unlikely that unrated firms would choose their interest rate exposure 
based on inflation figures. High inflation may be a general indicator of periods when there is 
more “loose money” in the market and unrated firms have successfully made opportunistic 
issues to access the public debt markets in order to diversify their liability structure away 
from bank-originated debt. 
Debt maturity remains highly significant and negative, except for speculative grade issuers. 
For both investment-grade and unrated issuers, Size seems to correlate negatively with the 
likelihood of issuing floating rate debt. 
Finally, the table reports again the adjusted R-squared values. An interesting observation is 
that the explanatory power of the model is only fractional for the speculative grade and 
unrated issuers (0.02 and 0.12, respectively) compared with investment grade issuers. The 
number of issues performed by the first two constitutes only about 18% of the total number 
of issues in the sample, meaning that only a few of non-investment-grade issues come to the 
market each month. Thus, their issuance behaviour may very well be better explained by 
16 I use the IVPROBIT command available in Stata 9.2. It fits probit regression models of binary outcomes with 
endogenous regressors. Estimations are be performed by maximum likelihood estimation. Fixed effects or 
rating dummies are not included in the regressions. 
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factors other than those related to market timing. For instance, unrated issuers are usually not 
continuously active but more likely to be issuing their first bond in the market, in which case 
market timing can reasonably is not the most prevalent factor in determining the interest rate 
exposure. Nevertheless, results presented in earlier regressions are robust and not materially 
affected by whether or not non-investment-grade issuers are included in the sample. 
Linear probability model
Investment grade Speculative grade Unrated
Independent Variables I II III
Interest rate variables
Level -0.098*** -0.059** -0.023
[0.018] [0.027] [0.080]
Slope -0.079*** -0.071 0.008
[0.024] [0.056] [0.099]
Issue characteristics
Maturity (LN) -0.481*** -0.197 -0.298**
[0.020] [0.132] [0.140]
Size (LN) -0.057*** 0.039 -0.126**
[0.013] [0.066] [0.061]
Macro economic controls
Bbbaaa -0.013 -0.069 0.068
[0.034] [0.075] [0.155]
Inflation 0.006 -0.014 -0.235***
[0.027] [0.067] [0.088]
3m Euribor volatility -0.275 0.195 0.156
[0.185] [0.295] [0.444]
10y swap volatility -0.299 -0.267 -1.593
[0.340] [0.531] [1.358]
Constant 2.045*** 0.903* 2.037***
[0.122] [0.516] [0.637]
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No No
Observations 1085 133 104
Adjusted R-squared 0.52 0.02 0.12
Robust standard errors (White(1980)) in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dichotomous dependent variable: Floating 0/1
Table 6 Credit quality and the determinants of interest rate exposure. Linear probability model (OLS)
1.5.4. Sampling by industry categories and sub-periods 
Hitherto, we have seen that the statistically significant negative coefficients for the 
macroeconomic variables are very consistent and that the maturity of debt is a major 
determinant for the choice of debt type. The estimated coefficients for the interest rate 
variables are, however, in contrast to previously reported findings. Can differences across 
major industry sectors, which do not appear in the full sample regressions, explain the 
opposite results?  
To explore the question, I divide the sample into four major industry super-categories based 
on the Fama&French industry identification described earlier in section 1.4. Figure 1 shows 
the relative number of floating rate issues by year for these major industry groups. We see 
what appears to be a rising trend in floating rate issuance for Consumer and Manufacturing 
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industries, while High-technology sector (which in this sample primary consists of issues by 
firms in the telecommunications sector) has a more erratic pattern of floating rate issuance. 
Table 7 presents truncated regression results for each industry super-category with the 
sample period split further into four equally long time-periods17. The model specification for 
column one in panel one is identical to column one in table 4. Regressions include all 
previously presented variables without industry or firm fixed effects. Each panel represents a 
separate industry super-category and columns II to V provide regressions for sub-periods of 



























































































Figure 1 Share of floating rate issues by industry super-categories. 
Focusing first on the full sample regressions in panel one, we notice that the significance of 
the estimated interest rate variables diminish during the different sub-periods and that the 
sign of the coefficients change also sporadically. The only sub-period with negative and 
significant Level and Slope coefficients are seen only in column IIII, comprising January 
2003 to December 2004. By contrast, the interest rate variables appear with opposite signs in 
columns II and V, where coefficient for the interest rate level is positive and negative for the 
term structure variable. Positive and significant estimates for these coefficients are found in 
column III, similar to the positive relationship between interest rate exposure and yield 
spread reported by Faulkender (2005). Also, adjusted R-squared values fluctuate over the 
sub-periods, indicating that the explanatory power of the model varies over time.  
Similarities with the full sample regressions are also apparent in the panels representing each 
industry super-category. Interest rate variables have negative correlations with the choice of 
debt type throughout column I, except for the Hitech sector, which has a positive Slope 
coefficient. All coefficients for the sub-period 2001-2002 in column III are, by contrast, 
positive and additionally highly significant in the third panel. Although not reported in the 
17 The last two-year period is only 23 months, since the sample does not include data for December 2006. 
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table, the maturity variable remains negative and significant at a 1% level for all 












Independent Variables I II III IIII V
Full sample
Level -0.092*** 0.059 0.313** -0.485** 0.081
[0.016] [0.110] [0.141] [0.208] [0.077]
Slope -0.077*** -0.129* 0.278** -0.200** -0.015
[0.022] [0.077] [0.116] [0.080] [0.102]
Obs. 1322 273 371 377 301
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.59 0.60
Consumer
Level -0.113*** -0.400 0.362 -1.151* 0.140
[0.041] [0.315] [0.395] [0.650] [0.180]
Slope -0.165*** -0.373** 0.290 -0.615** -0.140
[0.052] [0.179] [0.345] [0.267] [0.268]
Obs. 221 52 68 56 45
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.38 0.34 0.70 0.70
Manufacturing
Level -0.080*** -0.013 0.171 -0.296 0.128
[0.027] [0.197] [0.245] [0.326] [0.113]
Slope -0.089** -0.154 0.081 -0.065 -0.049
[0.035] [0.135] [0.195] [0.114] [0.163]
Obs. 550 89 133 189 139
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.55 0.43 0.59 0.52
Hitech
Level -0.085** -0.294 0.758** -1.553*** 0.196
[0.043] [0.348] [0.328] [0.423] [0.275]
Slope 0.009 -0.464 0.918*** -1.444*** 0.068
[0.067] [0.279] [0.292] [0.224] [0.305]
Obs. 205 45 67 46 47
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.62 0.21 0.78 0.58
Other
Level -0.059** 0.199 0.249 -0.509 -0.053
[0.029] [0.220] [0.276] [0.370] [0.144]
Slope -0.016 -0.021 0.278 -0.081 -0.175
[0.042] [0.136] [0.217] [0.182] [0.176]
Obs. 346 87 103 86 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.47 0.54 0.43 0.54
Issue characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional macro cntrls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No No No
Robust standard errors (White(1980)) in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dichotomous dependent variable: Floating 0/1
Table 7 Truncated regression results by industry origin over split sample periods. Issue characteristics 
and macroeconomic controls equal those presented in earlier tables.
One explanation may be the variation – or lack of it – in the interest rate variables during 
certain time periods. Especially the short end interest rate remained almost constant for more 
than two years in 2003-2005, as seen in table 2. Nevertheless, issuers do seem to time the 
market and the second and final sub-periods do indeed display mostly positive signs for the 
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macroeconomic variables, parallel to the findings by Faulkender (2005) and Vickery (2005). 
However, for the third period, 2003-2004, we observe negative estimates for the 
macroeconomic variables. This two-year period embraces both a historical low-point for 
European interest rates combined with the steepest in-sample yield curve. Additionally, 2003 
saw a high ratio of fixed-to-floating issuance (125-to-54), while 2004 reversed this statistic 
for the first time in favour of floating rate debt (92-to-98). That is, while the short-term 
interest rates fell in 2003, the yield-curve kept still rising, but with historically low interest 
rates, fixed rate issuance was still the preferred choice in the market. However, as the yield 
curve steepness peaked, issuers turned away from longer term fixed debt to favour adjustable 
rate debt in 2004.
1.6. Discussion on the reversed signs obtained for interest rate variables 
One of the prominent findings in this paper has been the negative and generally highly 
significant sign obtained for the primary macroeconomic coefficients. This is in sharp 
contrast to earlier empirical findings by Faulkender (2005) and Vickery (2005), who find a 
positive relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the likelihood of floating 
rate debt. At the same time, all results presented in this paper show that a negative 
relationship exists between the likelihood of issuing floating rate debt and the 
macroeconomic variables representing the slope of the yield curve and the level of short-end 
interest rates. The question remains, why are the results conflicting with previous findings? 
And why do the coefficients for the interest rate vary with time?  
Figure 2 Stacked movement of historical interest rates. Historical movement of European interest rates. 
Level is represented by 3m Euribor. Slope is the difference between harmonized 10y government 
bonds weighted by GPD and 3m Euribor. (Before 1994, Level and Slope correspond to the German 
3m Fibor and 10y German government bonds). Segments between the dotted vertical lines represent 
the decomposed samples in Table VII. Bar columns represent the relative share of floating rate 
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My sample period starts at the introduction of the common European currency, which saw 
daylight on January 1st, 1999. Pagano and von Thadden (2004) show that the introduction of 
the Euro established the bond market as an important source of long-term funding. In 
addition, a wave of consolidation and restructuring was occurring in Europe at the same 
time, particularly in the telecom-sector, which led firms to finance acquisitions with long-
term debt through public debt issuance.  
Figure 2 presents stacked historic movement of European interest rates and the slope of the 
yield curve beyond the studied sample period. In isolation, the movement of the 
macroeconomic variables seem quite substantial within the sample period and, if theory 
would hold, we would expect a higher share of floating rate issuance especially at the 
beginning of the sample period during higher interest rates, which seems not to be case. We 
observe that although the post-1999 interest rate levels display considerable variation, they 
are dwarfed by the pre-Euro times, when yields hovered substantially higher. In relative 
terms to these historical yields, the within-sample interest rate levels are low and the 
observed high frequency of fixed-rate financing occurring at these yields conforms much 
better to theoretical predictions. In fact, we see that the risk-free funding cost of long-term 
debt is well below historical averages. In effect, I argue that the wide new debt capital 
market under the common currency and the by historical standards low interest rate 
environment may have led opportunistic firms to seek fixed rate and longer term debt, 
closely resembling model predictions by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). In lack of data, I 
can only speculate about firms’ issuance behaviour prior to the introduction of Euro, but the 
explanation provided above would seem at least plausible in light of the transition towards 
lower interest rates under the common currency.  
1.7. Conclusions
This paper examines determinants for the original interest rate exposure of debt, whereby I 
have departed from a popular branch of research focused on derivatives and the final interest 
rate exposure of debt. My approach has allowed me to examine a far wider spectrum of 
issuers over a longer time period, whereas previous studies involving derivatives have been 
significantly restricted in either dimension – or both. Naturally, recognizing that bond issuers 
do not fund themselves solely through the public capital markets, the aim is to understand 
general determinants of debt type from an cost efficiency perspective that are characteristic 
for the European bond market, rather than explaining the drivers affecting the overall choice 
of debt and its interest rate exposure. 
Studying incremental debt issues on the European debt capital markets after the inauguration 
of common currency, I find evidence of market timing, confirming results from the survey 
conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) and the empirical work by Faulkender (2005) and 
Vickery (2005). The slope of the yield curve, considered a reliable indicator of macro 
economic conditions, appears in this study with an opposite sign to previously reported 
results. This finding is consistent through various robustness checks on the full sample. I 
postulate that the historically low interest rate environment have driven firms to primarily 
issue fixed rate debt, a results which aligns well with predictions by Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995), who argue that fixed rate debt is preferred when interest rates are below long-term 
averages.
In addition, I show that the maturity of debt has, by far, the strongest predictive power for 
the type of debt firms’ issue. I deal with potential endogeneity problems by employing an 
instrumental variable model. Long-term debt tends to be issued with fixed coupon payments, 
while average floating rate debt is significantly shorter in its term-to-maturity. The result is 
consistent with the general notion that bank originated debt is short in term and floating rate 
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(see e.g. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (2000) and Denis and Mihov (2003)). Thus, it 
would appears also that funding from the capital markets is used to some extent as a 
complement to the more maturity restricted, floating rate bank debt.
Increases in issue size are found to correlate negatively with the likelihood of floating rate 
debt. In fact, we have seen that the average size of debt issues with fixed interest rate 
payments are double that of floating rate notes. The intuition for such behaviour is easy to 
understand; large blocks of interest rate sensitive debt could have material effect on the 
financial stability of any firms if interest rates were to rapidly move in unfavourable 
direction. Even in cases where firm cash-flows are positively correlated with interest rate 
movements, operating income may not respond to such changes as fast as payable interest 
rate expenses, leaving a firm more exposed to financial distress. Bearing in mind that firms 
able to access the public capital markets have passed a certain threshold in terms of size, 
transparency and quality, as described by both Diamond (1991) and Covitz and Sharpe 
(2005), we should not forget that facing financial distress as a bond issuer may prove more 
costly than for firms depending solely on bank debt. Bank lending (and monitoring) builds 
by definition on the relationship between the lender and the borrower, who can jointly 
negotiate on the terms of debt contracts as financial distress is looming and before actual 
default occurs. By contrast, this ability is vastly limited for bond issuers, who usually are 
unable to renegotiate terms on such debt contracts with widespread groups of lender-
investors and have to succumb to very public proceedings in the case of default. This is 
potentially leading firms to minimize their interest rate exposures on large issues, as the 
presented empirical results have shown. 
Consequently, we have also seen that firms of credit qualities belonging to the speculative-
grade category issue a lion’s share of bonds with fixed coupon payments, while floating rate 
debt is more likely issued by firms of higher, investment-grade quality, parallel to signalling 
models by both Flannery (1986) and Titman (1992). However, having been assigned a credit 
rating usually indicates that the firm is at least to some extent more active in the public 
market domain and evidence shows that both speculative-grade as well as investment-grade 
firms time the market with respect to interest rate movement. By contrast, firms lacking a 
credit rating seem not to engage themselves in market timing. A low issue frequency added 
with a lack of transparency due to the absence of a credit rating suggests that unrated firms 
perform issues in isolated attempts to tap the capital to complement their mainly bank-
originated debt structure.
Future research could well be focused to specifically track the drivers behind the issuance 
behaviour for infrequent issuers, such as speculative-grade and unrated issuers. Are these 
firms increasingly moving away from bank financing towards market-based debt? Do these 
firms sporadically seek to secure debt through bond issues when they require external funds 
or are only certain types of investments and projects funded with public debt? This is hard to 
establish based on the evidence and data at hands, but studying cash-flows and approved 
credit-lines in the banking sector could shed further light on the issue. 
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COSTLY LEMMINGS IN THE BOND MARKET?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM STRUCTURE
OF CREDIT SPREADS 
Abstract
The paper examines the credit spread between government and corporate bonds at different 
maturities. Theoretical models assume that credit risk premiums for high quality firms are 
monotonously increasing with maturity. I find evidence suggesting that bonds issued at 
maturities attracting the highest issuance volumes tend to have credit risk premiums that are 
on average 10 to 15 basis points higher than issues at non-conventional maturities. These 
results seem to highlight a shortcoming of existing theoretical models and show that the 
credit yield curve is not smooth, but affected by the local supply of issues at various parts of 
the yield curve. In addition, the empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that 
firms utilising the bond markets for funding could lower their funding costs by shifting the 
term of their debt away from the most commonly targeted maturities. 
Keywords: Credit spreads, bonds, primary market, Eurobonds   
JEL Classifications: G12, G14, G15
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1.1. Introduction 
This paper examines the credit yield curve for risky debt, or more specifically, the credit 
spread between government and corporate bonds at different maturities. Current literature 
has explored both theoretically and empirically the factors affecting the overall credit risk 
premium with the normal assumption of a smooth credit yield curve of increasing, 
decreasing or hump-shaped form1. That is, risky debt pays a premium over the Treasury 
yield curve that relates to the probability of default, the expected loss in case of default and a 
compensation of bearing systematic, non-diversifiable credit risk.
On the other hand, researchers have suggested that the credit yield curve may not conform to 
the assumption of a smooth credit curve; testing determinants for the choice of debt maturity 
on primary market data Guedes and Opler (1996) conclude that markets may systematically 
misprice bonds in parts of the yield curve. Meanwhile, Elton et al. (2001) make a vast 
contribution to the literature by examining the spot rate differences between corporate and 
government debt on the secondary market. By decomposing credit spreads into components, 
they are able to explain how the spread differential is allocated between these components. 
In adopting the Nelson and Siegel (1987) methodology for estimating the spot rates used in 
the analysis of credit spreads, Elton et al. (2001) exclude –by definition of the model– any 
irregularities in the pricing of credit risk over the term structure, since the model provides a 
smooth estimation of the spot yield curve. This approach has many advantages, namely that 
coupon-stripped zero-coupon corporate and government term structures provides more 
accurate estimates of credit spreads, since different coupon rates in the benchmark and 
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Figure 1 Issuance volumes by maturity 
Figure 1 presents the number of Euro-denominated corporate bonds issued between 1999-
2006 for the same maturity spectrum studied by Elton et al. (2001) and originating from 
within the EMU. We see a tremendous concentration of issues at five, seven and ten-year 
maturities, which receive some 82% of the total issuance volume. While these observations 
may stem from market practices on either the supply or demand side or reflect psychological 
1 See e.g. Edwin J. Elton, et al (2001), Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Robert S. Goldstein, and J. Spencer Martin 
(2001), G. Gabbi and A. Sironi (2005) 
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attachments to distinct figures, they do inevitably lead to the question of whether the pricing 
of credit at various maturities is as consistent as employed models assume. It is hardly 
surprising that corporate bonds are issued at maturities corresponding to common expiries of 
government benchmark bonds, but the question still remains whether debt issues at non-
conventional maturities are priced with equal efficiency? In other words, is the term structure 
of credit risk for new issues as smoothly increasing as many theoretical models predict and 
various studies assume?  
The empirical approach adopted in this study departs from previous studies in two essential 
ways; first, the objective is not to test existing theoretical models, but empirically explore the 
pricing of credit risk over the yield curve. Second, similar to Gabbi and Sironi (2005), the 
study is conducted on spreads observed at issuance in the primary market for corporate 
bonds, as opposed to traded securities on the secondary market, and reflects therefore the 
actual pricing of debt faced by firms seeking arm’s length funding on the capital market. I 
find empirical evidence that appears to point to a shortcoming in existing theoretical models, 
where the credit yield curve is not smooth, but affected by the supply of issues at various 
parts of the yield curve. Bonds issued at high volume maturities have credit spreads that are 
10 to 15 basis points higher than corresponding low volume maturities. On a fixed income 
market where median issue size is close to 500 million euros, the average maturity exceeds 6 
years and total annual issuance volume exceeds 151 billion euros, the aggregate cost of such 
underpricing is significant.2
1.2. Theoretical and empirical framework 
This section explores literature on the bond risk premium related to my study. I shortly 
introduce the main concept of structural- and reduced-form models and review a selection of 
empirical studies and their central results.  
1.2.1. Estimating the term structure of credit risk  
Structural-form models originate from the option-pricing framework by Black and Scholes 
(1973). Merton (1974) utilises this framework to model corporate liabilities as contingent 
claims on firm’s assets.. The credit spread in Merton’s (1974) model is essentially a function 
of two factors; i) the variance of firm operations (business risk) and ii) ratio of debt value to 
firm value (financial risk), where default is triggered when the firm value falls below some 
threshold level. That is, default threshold is a function of the amount of debt outstanding. 
Merton shows that debt by non-distressed firms has a positive relationship between the credit 
spread and maturity, while issuers closer to distress face a downward sloping or hump-
shaped credit yield curve. Models augmenting the Merton approach for valuing risky debt 
based on asset values have been developed by, among others, Kim, Ramaswamy and 
Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996) and Collin-
Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).  Merton’s model assumes non-stochastic interest rates, while 
Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) allow interest 
rates to be stochastic. Leland and Toft (1996) provide a closed-form solution to estimate 
credit spread, which considers the optimal capital structure when firms are able to choose 
both the maturity and amount of debt it issues. In similar vein, Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2001) considers time-varying changes in firm value and debt capacity and show 
that speculative-grade firms can have an upward sloping term structure of credit spreads.
Structural-form models suffer from difficulty of empirical implementation, since the value of 
assets may not be known. As a result, they have been countered by another strand of 
2 Statistics are provided by the European Commission. 
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theoretical literature abstracting from the use of firm value to establish default. By contrast, 
reduced-form models assume that the default process is driven by an exogenous random 
variable; the probability of default and the recovery rate in case of default vary stochastically 
over time. For instance, Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) provide a model where the 
probability of default follows a Markov process. The authors fit the model to price data for 
bonds of various corporate credit ratings, resulting in similar credit yield curve shapes as the 
Merton model. That is, they show that investment grade bonds have upward-sloping credit 
yield curves, while speculative grade bonds have a downward-sloping credit curve. Other 
reduce-form models include e.g. Litterman and Iben (1991), Lando (1998) and Duffie and 
Singleton (1999). Litterman and Iben (1991) recognize that the term structure of credit risk is 
not flat.   
1.2.2. Empirical studies on the determinants of credit risk premiums 
Empirical tests on both structural- and reduced-form models argue that both models suffer 
from inaccuracy by underestimating the risk premiums for risky bonds when compared with 
the market observations and provide mixed results on the term structure of credit spreads 
(see e.g. Lyden and Saraniti (2000) or Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) for tests on 
structural-form models and Duffee (1999) for reduced-form models.). Related empirical 
work finds evidence both supporting and to some extent conflicting the model prediction for 
the shape of credit curves (see. e.g. Sarig and Warga (1989), Helwege and Turner (1999), 
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) and on European data van Landschoot (2003)). 
Nevertheless, consensus in the literature establishes that the credit yield curve for high-grade 
bonds is increasing with maturity, while disagreement prevails on its shape for lower quality 
firms. Further, empirical evidence on the determinants of credit risk premiums show that 
spreads are also affected by tax considerations, secondary market liquidity and non-
diversifiable systematic risk (Elton et al. (2001)) , (Elton et al. (2004)), Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), Crabbe and Turner (1995))3.
Graham and Harvey (2001) conduct a survey among chief financial officers and find that 
CFOs shift the maturity of issued debt to take relative advantage of low interest rate yields. 
In addition, Duffee (1998) show that there exists a negative correlation between Treasury 
yields and the credit risk premiums for corporate bonds. Studying the determinants of 
corporate debt maturity on primary market data, Guedes and Opler (1996) find evidence to 
suggest that managers of issuing firms may be responding to mispricing of bonds in part of 
the yield curve by altering the maturity of issued debt. As the total cost of debt for any given 
issue for not only comprise the level and term premium of interest rates, but also the credit 
risk spread, it would be expected that rational managers consider all aspects of the pricing of 
debt and respond to both the macroeconomic factors as well as mispricing no the market to 
secure the most attractive priced debt. 
1.3. Data and empirical implementation 
My objective is to investigate whether the pricing of credit risk is as monotonic as suggested 
by theoretical models, or more specifically, whether the distribution of issues in terms of 
volume affects pricing at different maturities. Following Gabbi and Sironi (2005), the focus 
of this study lies on the pricing of bonds in primary market, with no specific theoretical 
model assumed as the basis for the bond pricing. In essence, the approach taken here is to 
examine the pricing of credit risk at various maturities, rather than test a specific theoretical 
model in explaining the shape of the credit yield curve. In this section I discuss the data on 
3 Apart from Gabbi and Sironi (2005), all others conduct their studies on secondary market data. 
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which the study is conducted and the proxy variables used in the regressions for explaining 
the credit spreads. 
1.3.1. Research methodology 
The Euro and its capital market have enabled firms to tap into a large pool of investors to 
seek funding; chart 1 presents an overview of the maturities firms target when issuing bonds. 
We can observe a high concentration of issues at five-, seven- and ten-year maturities. 
Indeed, these issues account for more than 80 percent of the entire issuance volume and in 
excess of 86 percent of the size-weighted issuance in the final sample. In viewing chart 1, 
one inevitably lends a thought to whether the pricing of credit risk is equally efficient over 
the entire maturity spectrum. Meanwhile the assumption of common yield curve models is 
that the credit yield curve is monotonously increasing for good-quality issuers. With regards 
to these central themes, the aim of this study is to shed some light on the pricing of credit 
risk at different maturities and test whether pricing distortions exist between the high volume 
maturities and the rest of the credit yield curve. 
The credit risk premium over the risk-free government bond yields reflect investors’ 
perception of the risk of loss and bonds’ primary and secondary market efficiency and 
liquidity. A vast number of prior studies have explicitly considered the secondary market 
credit spreads of traded fixed income securities, whereas I have chosen to depart from this 
convention and follow the approach adopted in Gabbi and Sironi (2005) by looking at the 
primary market spreads, which constitute the actual cost of borrowing firms face when 
issuing debt. No theoretical model is assumed as a basis for my study and the analysis 
attempts to capture factors affecting the bond issuance spreads and test for distortions over 
the yield curve. My model is to some extent influenced by the reduced-form model of Duffee 
(1998) with added variables to control for issue specific characteristics. In line with this 
reasoning, the analysis is conducted with a model of the following form: 
SPRDi = i + 1[+/–]HIGHVOLi + 2[–]LEVELt + 3[–]SLOPEt + 4 [+]BBBAAAt + 5[+]MATi +
6
[–]SIZEi + 7[+/–]EFFi + 8 [–]CRED_QUALi + 9[+/–]INDi + i
Where:
SPRDi = is the difference in basis points between the yield to maturity at launch of a given 
issue and the yield to maturity of the German Bund curve at a similar maturity. 
HIGHVOLi = dummy variable with value 1 if the issue is performed at high volume 
maturities of five, seven or ten-year and zero otherwise. 
LEVELt = the level of 3 month Euribor rates 
SLOPEt = the slope of the yield curve 
BBBAAAt = secondary market risk premium defined as the difference between AAA and 
BBB rated corporate debt 
MATi = Maturity of issue i in years at launch
SIZEi = Size of issue i in Euros at launch  
EFFi = primary market efficiency, which I proxy by the number of financial institutions 
involved in the sale of issue i. 
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CRED_QUALi = dummy variable for the credit quality of issue i as defined by credit ratings 
assigned by Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s
INDi = dummy variable representing the industry sector of the issuing entity. 
The expected sign of estimated coefficients is indicated in the model. 
1.3.2. Data
My data set originates from the Dealogic database, containing issue-specific information on 
Euro-denominated bond issues made by EMU-country residents from January 1st, 1999 to 
November 31st, 2006.  The study is restricted to include debt issued by non-financial firms.  
Raw data comprises 14.902 observations. I eliminate issues by governments4, supranationals, 
financial institutions and any linked category based on the issuer type and issuer industry 
coded in the database. I further exclude collateralized or covered bonds; bonds with various 
embedded option-features; subordinated bonds; currency-, inflation- or index-linked bonds; 
bonds with uneven payment schedules; tap-issues5 and other irregular features as noted in 
the database. Unclear entries are cross-referenced with the Thomson ONE Banker database. 
Incomplete or missing records are subsequently excluded from the sample. I further restrict 
the analysis only to include bonds issued with a term to maturity of ten years or less and by 
firms of investment-grade credit quality. This choice is motivated by several factors; first, 
90% of all issues in the entire sample are performed at maturities less than or equal to ten 
years6. Second, issues beyond ten years are highly dispersed making the spread analysis at 
longer maturities increasingly inaccurate. Third, the credit risk premiums of speculative-
grade and unrated issuers may vastly differ from that of investment-grade firms due to 
increased likelihood of distress. Fourth, these restrictions follow those adopted by Elton et 
al. (2001), which makes comparison between the studies easier. Thus, the final sample 
consists of 486 plain vanilla bond-issues by 206 individual non-financial corporate EMU-
residents7.
The credit spreads for each bond issue is computed using the German Bund yield curve as a 
basis for risk-free interest rate yield. In other words, the credit spread is the difference 
between the yield to maturity at launch of a given issue and the yield to maturity of the 
German Bund curve at a similar maturity. Daily data on the German Bund yield curve is 
obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB). 
Interest rate data used in the regressions to quantify macroeconomic conditions in the Euro-
area is gathered from the European Central Bank (ECB). Interest rates representing the yield 
curve are monthly averages and weighted by the nominal outstanding amounts of national 
government bonds in each maturity band. The slope of the yield curve is defined as the 
4 Debt issues, which have been granted a state-guarantee of repayment, are also excluded. 
5 Tap-issues are re-issues of a bond, executed in varying amounts and at different times, usually in response to 
investor demand. The main terms of the bond (issuing conditions, coupon and maturity) remain unchanged, but 
the issue price can vary according to market conditions. Tap-issues on bonds are thus left outside the sample, 
since they would induce a bias as the same bond appears multiple times in the sample. 
6 Specifically, applying a 365 days / year convention, I include issues with a term to maturity of less than 10 
years and 182 days or 10.499 years.  
7 All non-financial corporate issuer residing within the EMU-area are considered; Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece (2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. However, 
issuers in related colonies or territories to EMU countries, such as the French Polynesia or the Netherlands 
Antilles are omitted. On the other hand, issues by subsidiaries to other than EMU-residents are left in the 
sample; e.g., Toyota’s European arm, Toyota Motor Finance BV located in the Netherlands belongs to the final 
sample. 
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difference between 10-year government bonds and the 3-month Euribor rate. International 
Index Company produces iBoxx bond-indices, which I use for calculation of the credit risk 
premium between AAA- and BBB-category investment-grade bonds. iBoxx-data is available 
from April 1st 1999 onwards.  
Credit ratings by both Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s have been assigned to 237 of the 486 
bonds in the final sample, while the remaining 249 bond issues have a single rating assigned 
by only one of the credit rating agencies. I recode the rating categories with integer numbers 
in ascending order, where the highest AAA/Aaa-rating is coded as “1” and the lowest BBB–
/Baa3 is coded as “10”. For issues with split ratings, a composite rating is calculated 
corresponding to an average of the values of the separate ratings assigned by the rating 
agencies. The rating scales, corresponding values and issue frequencies are shown in table 1. 
Composite
Moody's Standard & Poor's Value Obs. categories Value Obs.
Aaa AAA 1 42 AAA 1 42
Aa1 AA+ 2 14
Aa2 AA 3 21 AA 2 81
Aa3 AA- 4 46
A1 A+ 5 69
A2 A 6 55 A 3 194
A3 A- 7 70
Baa1 BBB+ 8 90
Baa2 BBB 9 49 BBB 4 169
Baa3 BBB- 10 30
Total 486 486
Rating agency
Table 1 Credit ratings by Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s  
1.4. Empirical tests and results  
In this section I review the results obtained from empirical tests. I begin by examining 
aggregate spreads over the maturity spectrum and dividing them into broad credit rating 
categories. I extend the analysis by performing regressions on the presented model to control 
for theoretically motivated factors affecting credit spreads.  
1.4.1. Observing the credit yield curve 
Panel 1 of table 2 shows primary market credit spreads and standard deviations by maturity 
and credit rating categories for the sample firms. Maturities with high issuance volume (5, 7 
and 10 year) are indicated as anchor points. Assuming that these high volume maturities are 
more efficiently priced than maturities attracting lower issuance volumes, I generate 
indicative credit spreads for the low volume maturities by interpolating credit spreads 
between the defined anchor points. For example, the indicative credit spread value for the 
full sample at a six-year maturity is 88.73bps, interpolated between anchor points of five and 
seven years (85.79bps and 91.67bps, respectively). To generate indicative values for the low 
end of the yield curve, the three year maturity has also been chosen as an anchor point. In 
addition, indicative credit spread values for issues of two-year maturity have thus been 
extrapolated from anchor points at three and five years. Chart 2 provides a graphical 
interpretation of the methodology; in the example the credit yield curve is representing all 
bonds issues in the final sample. Panel 2 of table 2 shows indicative credit spread values and 
results from t-tests for the differences between market spreads and indicative values at low 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For most part of table 2, differences between indicative values and observed values appear 
insignificant. Mean differences at low volume maturities are, however, mostly negative, 
suggesting that the actual credit spreads are lower than the indicative spreads derived from 
the high-volume maturity spreads. The finding is somewhat surprising, since it suggests that 
the unconventional maturities offer more favourable funding from a corporate perspective.  
Figure 2 Illustration of interpolation technique 
The analysis suffers from a number of drawbacks; first, the pricing within the broad credit 
rating categories can be wide and a more detailed analysis would be necessary. However, 
increasing the precision would further dilute the number of observations in each category 
and make the analysis unfeasible. Second, the time-varying risk-appetite of the market is not 
taken into account. Third, issue specific differences, pricing differentials between various 
industry sectors and macroeconomic factors all attribute to the level of credit spreads. I 
therefore continue the analysis by performing a series of regression analysis to gain further 
insight into the effects that issuance volume has on the pricing of credit risk. 
1.4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Utilising the model presented earlier, I perform a series of regressions with the primary 
market credit spreads over the risk-free rate as my dependent variable. Table 3 details the 
results; some interesting details emerge. 
First, the dummy variable representing issues at high volume maturities is consistently 
positive and significant with obtained estimates varying between 12.824 and 26.204. The 
results indicate that issues at commonly utilised maturities are priced lower –that is, with 
higher credit risk premiums– than corresponding issues targeting non conventional. Second, 
the regressions in columns two to seven include a maturity variable to control for the term 
premium of the credit yield curve described by Litterman and Iben (1991). Similar to 
previous studies, the estimated maturity coefficient is found significant and positive, except 
in the last column which does not include controls for credit ratings. Third, a deteriorating 
credit quality increases the spread monotonically, parallel to predictions and previous 
findings on primary market spreads by Gabbi and Sironi (2005). Fourth, time-varying affects 






















I II III IIII V VI VII
Independent Variables
HIGHVOL 24.914*** 14.017** 15.529*** 13.050*** . 12.824** 26.159***
[7.390] [5.475] [4.707] [4.528] . [5.709] [7.483]
MAT (LN) . 24.238*** 22.851*** 18.931*** 27.751*** 18.139** 11.834
. [8.072] [6.221] [6.122] [5.107] [7.710] [7.991]
LEVEL . 12.348*** 12.174*** 12.526*** . 14.700***
. . [2.773] [3.074] [3.050] . [3.611]
SLOPE . . -8.195** -8.000** -7.771** . -2.436
. . [3.511] [3.686] [3.651] . [4.499]
BBBAAA . . 60.280*** 59.497*** 59.053*** . 63.581***
. . [8.819] [8.903] [8.912] . [10.920]
SIZE  (LN) . . . 4.206 5.198* 5.255** -1.421
. . . [2.851] [2.856] [2.568] [3.914]
EFF . . . 0.952 0.424 -0.164 7.384**
. . . [2.394] [2.369] [2.706] [3.317]
CRED_QUAL dummies
Rating difference . . . 9.460** 10.335** 6.653 .
. . . [3.959] [4.055] [4.690] .
AA+ . 26.801 23.602* 20.734 22.979 22.286 .
. [18.937] [12.957] [13.689] [13.987] [16.442] .
AA . 33.140* 23.580** 19.641** 20.203** 27.074* .
. [18.070] [10.488] [9.838] [9.777] [14.160] .
AA- . 48.072*** 35.314*** 34.692*** 37.077*** 45.278*** .
. [15.023] [11.620] [10.494] [10.596] [10.992] .
A+ . 57.817*** 51.399*** 48.103*** 49.558*** 55.108*** .
. [15.744] [11.143] [10.697] [10.834] [12.576] .
A . 66.903*** 61.067*** 59.721*** 62.005*** 69.839*** .
. [14.670] [11.251] [10.552] [10.724] [11.571] .
A- . 88.962*** 72.388*** 71.992*** 73.491*** 80.990*** .
. [16.241] [12.288] [11.689] [11.953] [13.137] .
BBB+ . 112.341*** 99.930*** 98.514*** 99.907*** 110.361*** .
. [16.019] [11.886] [11.505] [11.804] [12.778] .
BBB . 131.236*** 110.093*** 111.370*** 115.297*** 120.237*** .
. [18.303] [14.092] [13.679] [13.926] [14.478] .
BBB- . 154.702*** 158.907*** 158.912*** 161.590*** 160.892*** .
. [20.451] [17.608] [17.716] [18.008] [19.401] .
Constant 56.861*** -79.430*** -149.241** -171.359** -183.827** -95.510*** -99.756***
[9.091] [27.131] [26.919] [27.857] [28.688] [31.720] [31.494]
Month-year dummies No Yes No No No Yes No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 486 486 468 468 468 486 468
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.665 0.687 0.693 0.689 0.719 0.416
Robust standard errors clustered by issuer in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Spread
Table 3 Multivariate analysis. Table shows OLS regression on the credit spreads over the risk-free rate. 
HIGHVOL has value 1 if the issue is of 5, 7 or 10 year maturity, zero otherwise. MAT is the natural 
log of term to maturity in years of a given issue. LEVEL is the monthly average of the 3m Euribor, 
SLOPE is the difference between 10-year government bonds and the 3-month Euribor rate. 
BBBAAA is the credit spread between AAA and BBB rated corporate bonds in the market. SIZE is 
the natural log of the size in Euros of a given issue. EFF measures the marketing efficiency of an 
issue, defined by the number of financial institutions involved in the sale of the bond. Rating 
difference takes the variable 1 if the rating agencies have assigned different credit ratings, zero 
otherwise.
column three by macroeconomic variables, which reflect the overall economic conditions; an 
increasing market credit risk premium8 and rising interest rate level increase the spreads of 
newly issued debt, while a steeper slope on the yield curve of interest rates appears to have a 
decreasing effect on credit spreads. A negative coefficient was expected for the short-term 
interest rates, suggesting that the obtained result is somewhat counterintuitive. Indeed, the 
positive sign also contradicts findings by Duffee (1998), who found a negative relationship 
8 I lose 18 observations when the market credit risk premium variable Bbbaaa is included, since this data is 
available only from April 1st, 1999 onwards. 
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between credit spreads and short term interest rates. I will explore this issue further in 
section 1.4.3. 
Issue specific variables are included in columns four through six. I do not find consistent 
significance in any of the variables. The Size variable is found mostly positive, but appears 
significant only in column three, where the regression model is fully specified. Thus, it 
seems that secondary market liquidity is not a relevant pricing argument.9 Obtained results 
follow those reported by both Gabbi and Sironi (2005) and Crabbe and Turner (1995), the 
latter of whom analyse yield differences between corporate bonds and medium-term notes. 
Disagreement of opinion between the rating agencies regarding an issuer’s credit quality 
increases the spread, indicating that uncertainty about the firms “true” credit worthiness is 
priced at the market. The variable does not, however, allow us to draw conclusions about 
how substantial the difference in assigned credit ratings is, nor does it tell if the two rating 
agencies have placed the credit worthiness of an issuer in entirely different categories.10
Nevertheless, we note that the coefficient is positive and significant in the full model 
regression, which is sufficient for the current analysis.
Finally, reported adjusted R2 -values suggest that the full model specification in column three 
explains some 69% of the variation in credit spreads. In all specifications of the model to 
control for various factors affecting the credit spreads, we find that the dummy variable 
representing the high volume maturities is both positive and highly significant, suggesting 
that these maturities bear a premium on issued debt. In addition, the variable has economic 
significance as the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is in excess of 10 basis points. 
Thus, the results would indicate a pricing distortion over the term structure of credit spreads 
in favour of maturities that do not attract the highest volume of issuance. 
1.4.3. Regressions on split samples 
The European capital market has endured tremendous transition from being distinguished by 
a myriad of national currencies to a having a common currency spanning all EMU-member 
countries. Although the transition to a new currency was immediate11, one could expect 
some lag in the market’s ability to adapt to the new environment, which is an argument 
worth investigating further. Moreover, results in table 3 raised a question about the 
relationship between short-term rates and spreads, which was expected to be negative, while 
the obtained regression results showed a positive relationship between the two. Therefore I 
continue my analysis of the term structure of credit spreads by splitting the sample in equally 
long time-periods12 –1999 to 2002 and 2003 to 2006– in order to gain insight into possible 
9 The same positive relationship between the spread at launch and the size of an issue is also apparent in 
regressions where I exclude jumbo-sized deals exceeding 1 billion Euros (not shown here). Further, the 
maturity of a bond is generally also assumed to affect a bond’s market liquidity. This measure rests on the 
belief that newly issued bonds are more liquid than bonds that have been in the market for a longer period of 
time (Elton et al, 2004). However, my sample consists entirely of newly issued bonds as the empirical analysis 
is based on spreads observed at issuance. 
10 A difference of one notch may be interpreted differently depending on whether the difference is e.g. BBB+ 
vs. BBB or A– vs. BBB+. In the latter case the difference in credit ratings exceeds boundaries for broad rating 
categories.
11 The national currencies of the member states officially ceased to exist on the 31st of December 1998 and the 
Euro became de facto currency on January 1st, 1999. 
12 The latter time-period is in fact one month shorter, since the sample period ends on November 31st, 2006. 
However, I have deemed it unnecessary to account for this small difference in the split sub-samples and find it 
more practical to split the sample at year-end 2002, instead of splitting the sample in mid-December of that 
same year.  
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effects imposed by a maturing capital market under the Euro-currency. Table 4 details these 
results. 







































Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 255 213
Adjusted R-squared 0.703 0.710
Robust standard errors clustered by issuer in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Spread
Table 4 Regressions with split sample. Table shows OLS regression on the credit spreads over the risk-free 
rate. HIGHVOL has value 1 if the issue is of 5, 7 or 10 year maturity, zero otherwise. MAT is the 
natural log of term to maturity in years of a given issue. LEVEL is the monthly average of the 3m 
Euribor, SLOPE is the difference between 10-year government bonds and the 3-month Euribor rate. 
BBBAAA is the credit spread between AAA and BBB rated corporate bonds in the market. SIZE is 
the natural log of the size in Euros of a given issue. EFF measures the marketing efficiency of an 
issue, defined by the number of financial institutions involved in the sale of the bond. Rating 
difference takes the variable 1 if the rating agencies have assigned different credit ratings, zero 
otherwise.
Beginning with the variable representing the short-term interest rates, we see that it appears 
negative, albeit insignificant at the first part of the sample period, while it is positive and 
highly significant during the latter sub-sample. I argue that these results are strongly 
associated with the exceptional interest rate environment that endured after the inauguration 
of the common currency. The general interest rate environment has been historically low 
over both periods, with an extended period of record low interest rates during the latter sub-
sample, during which the European Central Bank kept its key lending rate at two percent for 
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2.5 years. These extraordinary interest rate levels broke the general convention of a negative 
relationship between the short-end rates and credit spreads, thus yielding the positive and 
significant coefficient for the latter part of the sample period.
Next, we observe the high-volume dummy variable. The estimated coefficients are positive 
for both sub-samples, but found significant only for the sample spanning 1999-2002. Why 
would there be a significant credit spread premium during the first part of the sample period, 
but not the latter? There is no obvious difference in the concentration of issues to high 
volume maturities (1st half; 80.22%, 2nd half; 82.63%) and the general issuance activity 
during each sub-period does not differ remarkably from one another, as can be seen from 
table 5.
Maturity 1999-2002 2003-2006 Total
High volume 80.22% 82.63% 81.28%
Low volume 19.78% 17.37% 18.72%
2 11 5 16
3 24 8 32
4 9 6 15
5 92 39 131
6 8 9 17
7 59 64 123
8 1 8 9
9 1 1 2
10 68 73 141
Total 273 213 486
# of Obs.
Table 5 Issuance volume by sub-samples 
1.4.4. Different benchmark 
In so far I have assumed that the pricing of corporate bond issues is related to the credit risk 
premium over the risk-free rate defined by the German Bund yield curve. While the 
government bonds are generally considered as the risk-free and thus the theoretically true 
choice, whether or not this benchmark is the accurate base measure for the pricing of credit 
risk is not entirely clear. Due to the lack of a coherent benchmark government yield curve on 
the Euro capital markets, the European bond markets often price bonds against interest rate 
swaps; the swap yield curve presents a more liquid benchmark and has, over time, been 
accepted as a standardized method for pricing corporate bonds13 .  Could an ill-chosen 
benchmark be a cause of the obtained results? 
Table 6 provides results from regression analysis, where the dependent variable is not the 
credit spread over a government benchmark, but the credit spread of interest rate swaps. 
Again, we find that the high volume maturity dummy appears significant and positive during 
the first part of the sample period, while a pricing distortion is not present during the latter, 
although we still observe a positive sign for the estimated coefficient. What has changed? 
Although the proof is beyond the scope of this paper, one could speculate that the shift from 
pricing against benchmark bonds, to pricing bonds against a more liquid and coherent swap 
yield curve resulted in lower credit pricing differentials between the low and high volume 
maturities. Clearly, the market practice of issuing bonds primarily at maturities of five–, 
seven– and ten-year terms, corresponding to common expiries of government bonds, has not 
eroded during the sample period, but the pricing seems to have converged towards more 
consistent term structure of credit risk.
13 See e.g. G. R. Duffee (1996), Danthine, Giavazz, and Thadden (2000), John Hull, Mirela Predescu, and Alan 
White (2004) and J. P. Casey and K. Lannoo (2005).  
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Independent Variables I II III
1999-2002 2003-2006
HIGHVOL 10.660** 11.412* 8.369
[4.433] [6.772] [6.954]
MAT (LN) 20.181*** 17.760* 33.883***
[6.055] [9.290] [8.380]
LEVEL 2.601 -9.544 15.475
[3.178] [8.116] [9.573]
SLOPE -8.700** -27.262*** 8.064
[3.740] [9.306] [6.319]
BBBAAA 66.065*** 65.820*** 62.224***
[8.793] [9.134] [10.635]
SIZE  (LN) 4.434 4.816 2.521
[2.827] [3.210] [3.325]
EFF 0.940 1.541 1.404
[2.438] [3.318] [3.096]
CRED_QUAL dummies
Rating difference 8.510** 15.644*** 5.203
[4.061] [5.619] [6.451]
AA+ 20.719 2.949 19.113
[13.989] [25.176] [14.234]
AA 20.772** 30.818** 28.639
[10.310] [12.919] [21.378]
AA- 35.422*** 46.188*** 25.348*
[10.671] [12.098] [15.287]
A+ 48.720*** 47.963*** 39.173**
[10.964] [13.978] [15.471]
A 59.140*** 50.241*** 61.070***
[11.110] [14.644] [15.053]
A- 74.269*** 83.435*** 66.906***
[11.712] [13.509] [16.374]
BBB+ 99.739*** 108.469*** 90.011***
[11.656] [14.703] [16.983]
BBB 113.626*** 126.669*** 107.521***
[13.951] [16.881] [20.583]
BBB- 158.641*** 153.638*** 174.452***
[17.403] [17.805] [28.545]
Constant -171.098*** -98.728** -247.114***
[28.868] [46.456] [48.877]
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 468 255 213
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.71 0.71
Robust standard errors clustered by issuer in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Swap Spread
Table 6 Regressions on swap spreads. Table shows OLS regression on the credit spreads over interest rate 
swaps. HIGHVOL has value 1 if the issue is of 5, 7 or 10 year maturity, zero otherwise. MAT is the 
natural log of term to maturity in years of a given issue. LEVEL is the monthly average of the 3m 
Euribor, SLOPE is the difference between 10-year government bonds and the 3-month Euribor rate. 
BBBAAA is the credit spread between AAA and BBB rated corporate bonds in the market. SIZE is 
the natural log of the size in Euros of a given issue. EFF measures the marketing efficiency of an 
issue, defined by the number of financial institutions involved in the sale of the bond. Rating 
difference takes the variable 1 if the rating agencies have assigned different credit ratings, zero 
otherwise.
1.4.5. Further robustness checks 
In so far, the target maturities have been represented by a single dummy variable. Also, the 
whole range of investment-grade issuers has been pooled together in a single regression. 
Table 7 presents a final set of regression, which not only details the high volume maturities 
separately, but also performs individual regressions for each main rating category. 
First, we notice that each high volume dummy bears statistical significance with positive 
signs in column one, again indicating a premium in the pricing of issues at these maturities.  
16
I II III IIII V
Independent Variables Full sample AAA AA A BBB
HIGHVOL dummies
5 years 13.494*** 19.527 -6.238 2.449 24.025**
[4.694] [12.566] [8.791] [8.383] [9.298]
7 years 15.570** 39.683** 3.529 1.621 18.195
[7.725] [13.933] [15.914] [10.388] [15.187]
10 years 18.150* 47.814** -8.037 -4.296 15.283
[9.335] [18.407] [19.186] [13.919] [18.893]
MAT (LN) 13.811 -26.977 27.420 41.547*** 36.623**
[9.353] [20.012] [22.265] [13.841] [18.290]
LEVEL 12.213*** 13.389 11.052** 10.474** 9.412
[3.084] [9.798] [4.464] [4.328] [6.388]
SLOPE -7.980** -5.784 -8.429 -15.670** -4.016
[3.705] [10.849] [5.987] [6.914] [7.455]
BBBAAA 59.501*** 18.192** 8.075 40.010*** 121.944***
[8.917] [6.371] [8.920] [8.186] [14.194]
SIZE  (LN) 4.229 2.560 -0.470 5.152 5.972
[2.853] [4.763] [2.707] [4.176] [5.115]
EFF 1.013 0.368 4.807* -3.835 -5.051
[2.369] [5.615] [2.426] [2.489] [4.093]
CRED_QUAL dummies
Rating difference 9.552** 9.156 28.049*** 13.792*** 23.809**
[3.914] [16.589] [4.117] [4.986] [9.119]
AA+ 20.770 . -20.556* . .
[13.677] . [11.730] . .
AA 19.824** . - . .
[9.848] . - . .
AA- 34.813*** . 5.148 . .
[10.480] . [7.133] . .
A+ 48.094*** . . -8.501 .
[10.648] . . [5.642] .
A 59.806*** . . - .
[10.534] . . - .
A- 71.874*** . . 13.408* .
[11.785] . . [7.525] .
BBB+ 98.579*** . . . -11.939
[11.533] . . . [8.934]
BBB 111.518*** . . . -
[13.911] . . . -
BBB- 159.122*** . . . 47.392***
[17.476] . . . [17.347]
Constant -163.442*** -34.846 -59.540 -99.677*** -220.517***
[27.124] [32.815] [54.607] [34.136] [57.679]
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald F -statistic for the 
joint significance of the 2.81** 2.79* 0.79 0.40 2.97**
 maturity dummies
Observations 468 41 73 188 166
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.76 0.65 0.52 0.66
Robust standard errors clustered by issuer in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Spread
Table 7 Additional regressions for robustness. Table shows OLS regression on the credit spreads over the 
risk-free rate. Individual HIGHVOL dummies have the value 1 if the issue is of either 5, 7 or 10 year 
maturity, zero otherwise. MAT is the natural log of term to maturity in years of a given issue. 
LEVEL is the monthly average of the 3m Euribor, SLOPE is the difference between 10-year 
government bonds and the 3-month Euribor rate. BBBAAA is the credit spread between AAA and 
BBB rated corporate bonds in the market. SIZE is the natural log of the size in Euros of a given 
issue. EFF measures the marketing efficiency of an issue, defined by the number of financial 
institutions involved in the sale of the bond. Rating difference takes the variable 1 if the rating 
agencies have assigned different credit ratings, zero otherwise.
In addition, each column in table 7 reports a joint test of significance for the dummy 
variables. Columns two to five report separate regression results by credit quality. We 
observe positive and significant maturity dummies for firms of AAA and BBB quality, 
confirmed also by the F-statistic.
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Furthermore, we are able to measure the pricing difference within each broad credit rating 
category. The dropped quality dummy variable in each regression is the middle rating 
category.14 As expected, in each category, the higher rating has lower spreads and vice versa.  
1.5. Additional investigation of differences between maturity segments. 
Evidence presented in this paper suggests a pricing anomaly in the primary bond market 
favouring maturities deviating from the norm; issues targeting non-conventional maturities 
bear a lower credit risk premium, which appears both statistically and economically 
significant. A reasonable question is to ask why these differences exist when theoretically 
justified controls are incorporated in the regression model. Are there unobserved sample 
differences between the issues at conventional and non-conventional maturities?  
An intuitive argument for the observed phenomenon is that sophisticated investors may be 
more willing to extend funding at non-conventional maturities. It is reasonable to assume 
that these issues would be of a private-placement nature, where the appetite for corporate 
risk is investor driven and debt is directly placed to the institutional investors. Arak and 
Corcoran (1996) note that yield spreads private placement issues are sometimes lower than 
public issues and that the state of the economy drives the direction of the difference. 
Similarly, Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) study the yields spreads adjusted for transaction 
costs and find that the average yield for public issues exceeds those of private issues mainly 
since public issues involve higher flotation costs. By contrast, Zwick (1980) find that yields 
on private placements are higher than on public issues due to illiquidity. Thus, the status of a 
bond – whether it is of private or public nature – may explain the observed anomaly if issues 
of non-conventional maturities are placed directly to investors willing to grant at spreads 
lower than what can be obtain through widely auctioned debt issues. 
Unfortunately, reliable data on the debt type is not available for bond issued in the Euro 
bond market15, but statistical properties related to private placement issues may shed some 
light on the private-public status of a bond. Previous studies have shown that a number of 
factors appear to typify a private placement; the size of an average private placement issue is 
smaller than public issues (e.g. Carey et al. (1993) and Kwan and Carleton (2004)) and 
private placements have generally a shorter term to maturity (e.g. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and 
Patel (2000), Szewczyk and Varma (1991) and Carey et al. (1993)). 
Table 8 presents summary statistics on maturity, size and the primary market efficiency16 for 
bonds issued at high and low volume maturities. Panel 1 presents statistics on an annual 
basis while panel 2 divides the sample depending on whether a bond was issued under a debt 
programme or as a stand-alone issue. Issues at non-conventional maturities are generally of 
shorter term, smaller in size, and are placed less efficiently in the market than issues targeted 
to high-volume maturities. In addition, panel 2 shows that the proportion of stand-alone 
issues is higher within non-conventional maturities, suggesting that these bonds are more 
often issued uniquely outside normal debt programmes. This may suggest that stand-alone 
issues are made to meet a specific demand from debt investors. Alternatively, as debt 
14 The rating categories are, e.g.: A+, A and A–. Note that the highest, AAA rating category does not have plus 
or minus sub-categories within itself. 
15 The utilised database includes a dichotomous variable identifying issues as public or private. However, the 
information contained in this variable is both highly inaccurate and inconsistent. Further, the value in the 
variable is not reliably based on the true status of a bond, but rather on secondary measures defined by the data 
provider. Of the 486 issues included in the final sample, only 5 were identified as private placements by the 
database variable and 13 lacked the information entirely. Consequently, I have determined that the use of this 
variable is not suitable in the analysis.  
16 Recall that the efficiency was measured as the number of financial institutions – book runners – involved in 
the sale of a bond issue. 
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programmes are generally utilised by established capital market participants, a higher share 
of stand-alone issues could also indicate issues by new entrants in the market. In this case, a 
lower credit spread for these issuers would appear to suggest that investors are willing to 
lend at lower spreads with the intention of diversifying their debt holdings further.
PANEL 1
Low High Total Low High Low High Low High
1999 # obs. 6 47 53 Mean 3.98 7.85 Mean 525.40 637.32 Mean 2.33 2.09
Share 11.3% 88.7% 100.0% St.dev. 2.75 2.18 St.dev. 425.95 564.44 St.dev. 1.51 0.88
2000 8 52 60 3.51 7.00 446.25 591.35 2.00 2.17
13.3% 86.7% 100.0% 0.92 2.13 486.50 301.46 1.07 0.73
2001 26 71 97 3.19 6.64 691.92 957.54 1.88 2.31
26.8% 73.2% 100.0% 1.30 2.01 906.88 871.82 1.14 1.05
2002 14 49 63 3.93 7.16 477.57 786.22 1.64 2.45
22.2% 77.8% 100.0% 1.81 2.09 618.63 760.47 0.93 1.00
2003 15 63 78 4.26 7.71 451.67 764.29 2.27 2.90
19.2% 80.8% 100.0% 2.01 2.11 526.48 537.08 1.49 1.21
2004 7 37 44 5.16 8.15 398.86 605.22 2.57 3.11
15.9% 84.1% 100.0% 2.33 1.75 273.80 444.66 1.51 1.39
2005 6 31 37 4.77 7.31 333.33 674.11 2.33 2.84
16.2% 83.8% 100.0% 2.47 2.11 240.14 395.79 1.37 1.21
2006 9 45 54 5.89 8.02 505.56 766.67 3.00 3.09
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 1.97 2.04 199.13 398.58 1.12 1.02
Total 91 395 486 4.08 7.42 522.15 742.16 2.14 2.58
18.7% 81.3% 100.0% 1.95 2.11 616.95 602.30 1.25 1.12
PANEL 2
Low High Total Low High Low High Low High
Standalone # obs. 33 61 94 Mean 3.58 7.32 Mean 418.73 806.20 Mean 1.64 2.39
issue Share 36.3% 15.4% 19.3% St.dev. 1.45 2.19 St.dev. 546.13 609.64 St.dev. 0.99 1.08
Issue under 58 334 392 4.37 7.44 580.99 730.47 2.43 2.62
programme 63.7% 84.6% 80.7% 2.15 2.09 651.03 601.13 1.30 1.13
Total 91 395 486 4.08 7.42 522.15 742.16 2.14 2.58
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1.95 2.11 616.95 602.30 1.25 1.12
Efficiency
Debt issues Size EfficiencyMaturity
MaturityDebt issues Size
Table 8 Descriptive statistics of differences between maturity segments. 
Thus, descriptive statistics appear to highlight differences in the nature of issues targeted at 
either high or low volume maturities; a larger portion of debt issues at non-conventional 
maturities fit the characteristics described in previous studies of private placements type 
debt. While the lack data to accurately identify the actual public-private status of each bond 
issue diminishes our ability to draw clear conclusions regarding the pricing differences, the 
presented statistics appear signify that issues at non-conventional maturities meet more the 
characteristics of private placements, which are placed directly to investors willing to grant 
funding at spreads lower than what can be obtain through widely auctioned debt issues.17
1.6. Conclusions
This paper analyses pricing distortions over the credit yield curve. Theoretical models 
predict that credit risk premiums are monotonously increasing with maturity for high quality 
17 The scarcity of bonds issued at non-conventional maturities may also undermine the robustness of the results. 
Unfortunately, additional data is not available from the Euro bond market to augment the study in this respect. 
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firms. These models and related empirical research have usually focused their attention on 
credit spreads observed on traded, secondary market fixed income securities and fail 
therefore to embrace the initial costs of debt occurred at a firm level. In addition, the models 
do not consider supply and demand factors affecting the pricing of credit risk. 
I contribute specifically to the literature by focusing my study on the primary bond market, 
where the observed spreads constitute actual funding costs for firms seeking funding on the 
capital markets. I find that bonds issued at maturities attracting the highest issuance volumes 
tend to have higher credit risk premiums compared with bonds of non-conventional maturity. 
These results seem to highlight a shortcoming of existing theoretical models, where the term 
structure of credit spreads is not smooth, but affected by the local supply of issues at various 
parts of the yield curve. Bonds issued at common maturities have 10-15 bps higher credit 
spreads than corresponding low volume maturities, even after controls for issue specific 
variations, macro economic changes, issuer’s credit quality and industry differences are 
taken into consideration. 
Precisely why issuance volumes remain focused on certain maturities is not immediately 
clear and goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it would seem odd that firms target 
maturities which lead to higher capital costs of funding in the long run. The initial 
benchmarking of issues over government risk-free rates may be argued as a source for the 
distinct focus on certain maturities, as the benchmark bonds and as well as credit default 
swaps have traditionally been primarily available at these conventional maturities.  In light 
of these findings, one would expect issuers to adjust their targeted maturity dates to decrease 
funding costs.
Indirect evidence indicates that debt issues at non-conventional maturities are more often of 
private nature. Sophisticated debt investors are willing to extend directly placed funding at 
maturities deviating from the norm and at lower spreads, resulting in the non-monotonic 
term structure of credit spreads. The lack of robust data leaves, however, this explanation 
somewhat inconclusive, but invites further research to be conducted on the behaviour of 
European credit spreads. 
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